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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly,1 sending “shockwaves” through the federal litigation bar.2  
Seemingly without prior warning,3 the Court abrogated “the accepted 
rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief”—the standard for deciding 12(b)(6) motions first stated fifty 
years earlier in Conley v. Gibson.4  To replace the old rule, the Court 
announced a new “plausibility” standard:  that a complaint must 
                                                          
 1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 
(2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Thampi v. Collier County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 2:04-cv-441-FtM-
29SPC, 2006 WL 2460654, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2006) (“The federal notice 
pleading standards are well settled.”); McMahon, supra note 2, at 855 (“[T]he Conley 
standard was clear and well-settled.”). 
 4. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert 
the following defenses by motion: . . . failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted . . . .”). 
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allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”5 
Twombly contained some indications that the Court intended to 
limit its holding to Sherman Act cases.6  Nonetheless, the federal 
courts largely embraced Twombly’s “plausibility” standard for all 
cases.7  Almost two years to the day after Twombly, the Supreme Court 
laid the matter to rest in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 holding that the Twombly 
“plausibility” standard applies to all cases.9  Iqbal further explained 
that “judicial experience and common sense” should inform the 
“plausibility” standard.10   
In addition, Iqbal set forth a “two-pronged” approach to 12(b)(6) 
motions.  First, the court should identify and ignore all “conclusions” 
from the complaint not entitled to be taken as true for purposes of 
the motion to dismiss.11  Second, the court should apply the 
“plausibility” standard to the complaint’s remaining allegations.12  
If Twombly caused a shock, Iqbal struck a blow.  A firestorm of 
protest ensued over Iqbal’s alleged judicial activism.  For example, 
Senator Arlen Specter recently introduced a bill that would attempt 
to turn the clock back by reinstating “the standards set forth by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson.”13 
Absorbed by the vigorous academic debate, I wondered if it could 
be empirically demonstrated that district courts ruled much 
differently on 12(b)(6) motions after Twombly.  Thus, for this Article, 
I conducted an empirical analysis of the effects of the different 
Supreme Court standards on rulings on 12(b)(6) motions in the 
federal district courts. 
I chose, as randomly as possible, 1200 cases (500 from each of the 
two-year periods before and after Twombly), and I coded the cases for 
                                                          
 5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 6. See id. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for 
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”); id. at 
554–55 (“This case presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in 
order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); id. at 558–59 (discussing the 
expense of discovery in antitrust cases). 
 7. In reviewing cases to be selected for inclusion in this study, I found only one 
district court case in which the court refused to apply Twombly in a non-antitrust case.  
See Orthovita, Inc. v. Erbe, No. 07-2395, 2008 WL 423446, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 
2008).  Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals eventually adopted the “plausibility” 
standard for all civil cases, but some characterized Twombly as effecting only modest 
change.  See infra notes 137–144 and accompanying text. 
 8. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 1953. 
 10. Id. at 1950. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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their rulings and other characteristics in a database (the “Database”).  
Because Iqbal was decided recently, I chose (again, as randomly as 
possible) 200 cases decided on 12(b)(6) motions under Iqbal from 
May–August 2009, and I included them in the Database. 
My statistical analysis of the cases in the Database suggests that a 
surprisingly large percentage of 12(b)(6) motions was being granted 
(with or without leave to amend) under Conley—46% from May 2005 
to May 2007.  From May 2007 to May 2009, after Twombly was decided, 
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted grew to 48%—not a 
remarkable increase.  But since Iqbal was decided, a higher 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions has been granted:  56% of the 
12(b)(6) motions from May 2009 to August 2009 were granted.  
However, the short time span and smaller number of Iqbal cases 
counsel caution in interpreting the data. 
Part I of this Article describes Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, and 
surveys the development of the pleading standards in the fifty-two 
years spanned by these cases.  I conclude, as have other 
commentators, that although courts continued to pay lip service to 
the “notice pleading” ideal of Conley, in practice, the standard was 
seriously eroded by the time Twombly was decided.  Iqbal, though, 
contains not even a passing reference to notice pleading, and may 
portend the end of this liberal regime in the federal courts. 
Part II outlines the design of the empirical study, and Part III 
presents a statistical analysis of the data.  The analysis reveals that 
49% of the 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave to 
amend) over the time period of the study.  Further, it confirms that 
the rate at which such motions were granted increased from Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal, although grants with leave to amend accounted for 
much of the increase.  In addition, the results of a multinomial 
logistic regression indicate that under Twombly, the odds that a 
12(b)(6) motion would be granted with leave to amend, rather than 
denied, were 1.81 times greater than under Conley, holding all other 
variables constant.  Under Iqbal, the odds that a 12(b)(6) motion 
would be granted with leave to amend, rather than denied, were over 
four times greater than under Conley, holding all other variables 
constant.  Moreover, in the largest category of cases in which 
12(b)(6) motions were filed—constitutional civil rights cases—
motions to dismiss were granted at a higher rate (53%) than in all 
cases combined (49%), and the rate 12(b)(6) motions were granted 
in those cases increased from Conley (50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal 
(60%). 
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Part IV concludes, with some caution, that Twombly and Iqbal have 
significantly increased the rate at which 12(b)(6) motions have been 
granted by district courts, and suggests that this result, if desirable, 
should be accomplished by the normal rule amendment process 
rather than by a ruling of the Court. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS 
A. The World Before Twombly 
The reformist philosophy and merits-based focus of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), first adopted in 1938, have been 
well chronicled elsewhere.14  For my purposes here, it suffices to say 
that Rule 8(a)(2) of the FRCP—unchanged since 1938—requires a 
complaint (or other pleading seeking relief) to contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”15  The drafters chose this language deliberately to signal the 
softening of an earlier pleading regime known as “code pleading,” 
under which the equivalent requirement was that a complaint 
contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action.”16  
Case law in code pleading regimes had devolved into endless, 
technical bickering about distinctions between “ultimate facts,” 
“evidence,” and “conclusions.”17  Thus, the FRCP’s use of the phrase, 
“claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” instead of the 
phrase from the code pleading standard, “facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action,” was an attempt to create a standard that would 
                                                          
 14. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Rule 8 of the FRCP was designed with flexibility to allow more frequent 
examination of the merits of a claim); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and 
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 890–98 (2009) (highlighting the 
vision of the FRCP drafters to make pleading rules more fair and efficient); Charles 
E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458–60 (1943) (recognizing that 
complicated pleading requirements led to a call for reform); Richard L. Marcus,  
The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
433, 437–51 (1986) (noting that a general dissatisfaction with pleading requirements 
led to simplification of the rules). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 16. Anthony J. Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 794 
(2004) (quoting Act of Apr. 12, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521). 
 17. Marcus, supra note 14, at 438 (explaining that Code pleading “invited 
unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ultimate 
fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusions (improper),” and that 
courts had “great difficulty distinguishing ultimate facts from conclusions since so 
many concepts, like agreement, ownership[,] and execution, contain a mixture of 
historical fact and legal conclusion” (citation omitted)). 
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reach the merits of a dispute rather than one that would terminate a 
plaintiff’s case on technical grounds at the outset.18 
Yet there were still rival pleadings philosophies.  One of the FRCP’s 
primary draftsmen, Judge Charles Clark, was convinced that 
pleadings motions were wasteful and often unjust, and would have 
eliminated them altogether.19  The opposing camp, however, 
emphasized the need for some screening effort to prevent 
nonmeritorious cases from proceeding.20  The Supreme Court in 
Conley sided mostly with Judge Clark, at least for the moment. 
1. Conley v. Gibson 
The Conley “no set of facts” language materialized in the Court’s 
opinion even though the lower courts had not discussed the pleading 
issue and even though the plaintiffs had hardly briefed the issue 
before the Court.21  Conley was brought as a putative class action by 
“certain Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and 
Steamship Clerks . . . against the Brotherhood, its Local Union No. 
28 and certain officers of both” (collectively, the “Union”).22  
Plaintiffs alleged that they were employed by the Texas and New 
Orleans Railroad in Houston, and that Local 28 was their designated 
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).23  The 
collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and the Union 
provided some protection to the Union members against loss of 
employment or seniority.24  The complaint alleged that despite the 
existence of this protection, the railroad had “abolished” forty-five 
jobs held by Negroes and then refilled (through a wholly owned 
subsidiary) those jobs with either white employees or Negroes 
                                                          
 18. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).  Referring to 
the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under the Code pleading standard, 
Judge Clark stated, “[H]ere is another instance of judicial haste which in the long 
run makes waste.”  Id. 
 19. Clark, supra note 14, at 456. 
 20. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 890 (identifying many courts’ concerns about 
backlog, costs, and delay as reasons to support a higher level of screening). 
 21. Despite Justice Black’s statement in Conley that the issue had been “briefed . . 
. by both parties,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957), in fact, only the Union 
expressly addressed pleading issues in its brief to the Supreme Court.  See Petitioner’s 
Brief at 3–4, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87661 
[hereinafter Pet’r’s Br.].  For a further discussion of the “accidental” nature of 
Conley’s prominence, see Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley:  Precedent by Accident, in 
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2008). 
 22. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.  Gibson, the named defendant, was the General 
Chairman of Local Union No. 28. 
 23. Id. at 43; see also Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as 
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006)). 
 24. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
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“rehired” with loss of seniority.25  The complaint alleged further that 
despite plaintiffs’ requests, the Union did nothing to prevent or 
protest these discriminatory discharges as it would have done if the 
plaintiffs had been white.26 
Plaintiffs’ legal claim was that the Union had violated their rights 
to fair representation under the RLA.27  The Union moved to dismiss 
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board (“Adjustment Board”) had exclusive 
jurisdiction), failure to join an indispensable party (the railroad), and 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.28 
The lower courts addressed only the jurisdictional issue, and thus 
found it unnecessary to reach the pleading issue.  The district court 
held that it lacked jurisdiction under the RLA “since plaintiffs 
raise[d] no question of the lawfulness of the selection of Local 28 as a 
bargaining agent, nor of the validity of [the collective] bargaining 
agreement.”29  The appellate court affirmed per curiam and 
essentially without opinion, except for the citation of two cases 
regarding jurisdiction.30 
The Conley Court made short shrift of the jurisdictional issue, 
pointing out that this was a dispute between an employee and his 
union and that the RLA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the 
Adjustment Board only in “disputes between an employee . . . and a 
carrier.”31  The Court then cursorily held that the railroad was not an 
indispensable party and then turned to the pleading issue for which 
the case is known.32 
Frequently, courts citing Conley overlook that fact that the Court’s 
pleading analysis proceeded in two parts, only the first of which 
invoked the infamous “no set of facts” language.  The two parts 
correspond to two ideas often invoked in pleadings disputes:   
the legal sufficiency of a claim and the requisite level of specificity of 
the allegations.33 
                                                          
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Conley v. Gibson, 138 F. Supp. 60, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1955), aff’d, 229 F.2d 436 
(5th Cir. 1956), rev’d, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 30. Conley v. Gibson, 229 F.2d 436, 436 (5th Cir. 1956), rev’d, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 31. Conley, 355 U.S. at 44 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (2006)). 
 32. Id. at 45. 
 33. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that a court can dismiss where a legal theory is not asserted or where 
sufficient facts are not alleged). 
  
560 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:553 
The Union made both arguments in its Supreme Court brief, but it 
did not organize or label them as such.  First, as to “legal sufficiency,” 
the then-governing law under Supreme Court precedent was “that an 
exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated 
to represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without 
discrimination because of race and . . . the courts have power to 
protect employees against such invidious discrimination.”34  The 
Union conceded this principle, but argued that the complaint’s 
allegation that the Union failed to protest the firings and rehirings 
was insufficient to constitute discrimination; otherwise, a union 
would be required to protest each time a union member had a 
grievance with an employer, regardless of the merit of the grievance.35  
Admittedly, this is a strained argument that conveniently overlooks 
the thrust of the complaint; but in concept, it is a legal sufficiency 
argument:  plaintiff complains that the Union did not protest, but the 
duty of fair representation does not require it to protest. 
At this point, the Court expounded the “no set of facts” language 
that Twombly would later abrogate: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, 
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.  Here, the complaint alleged, in part, 
that petitioners were discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and 
that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect their 
jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them with their 
grievances all because they were Negroes. If these allegations are 
proven there has been a manifest breach of the Union’s statutory 
duty to represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the 
employees in the bargaining unit.36 
As to the “factual specificity” branch of its pleading argument,  
the union asserted: 
The factual allegations of the Complaint are completely vague as to 
what provisions of, or in what manner, the bargaining agreement 
was violated by the Railroad when it abolished the particular jobs in 
question . . . .  There are no factual allegations that it ever 
happened before, or that it happened pursuant to an agreement 
between the Railroad and Respondents . . . [W]hat specific conduct by 
the [Union] discriminated against [plaintiffs] in favor of white 
                                                          
 34. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted). 
 35. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et al. at 32, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87662 [hereinafter Resp’ts Br.]. 
 36. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (citations omitted). 
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employees and thus constituted a breach of its statutory duty of fair 
representation?37 
In other words, the Union argued that the complaint’s allegations 
of discrimination were conclusory.  Justice Black could have 
responded in kind to the Union’s lack-of-specificity argument by 
either pointing out that the complaint did make such allegations,38 or 
that the specificity the Union wanted was irrelevant under the 
substantive law.39  Instead, the Court retorted with the general 
philosophy of notice pleading: 
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts 
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules 
require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that will give 
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.40 
This is the part of Conley that remains good law under Twombly—
and maybe Iqbal. 
2. The 12(b)(6) spiel 
For decades, courts have started their opinions with boilerplate 
language about the governing standards of a 12(b)(6) motion, the 
gist of which is learnedly described by Wright & Miller,41 but which I 
have irreverently come to call the “12(b)(6) spiel.”  The “no set of 
facts” versus “plausibility” standard is only a portion of the spiel. 
Of course, courts frequently begin their recitations by quoting Rule 
8(a)(2).  After Conley, the boilerplate language almost always 
included that case’s two best-known quotes:  the “no set of facts” 
                                                          
 37. Resp’ts Br., supra note 35, at 26–27, 31. 
 38. For example, the complaint alleged that the defendant violated the security 
provisions of the bargaining agreement.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.  The complaint 
also alleged that the railroad and the Union had entered into a “Union Shop 
Contract” which also contained security provisions that the defendant violated.  
Pet’r’s Br., supra note 21, at 4. 
 39. Under the substantive law, the Union’s actions could have been 
discriminatory even if the Union had not agreed with the railroad to engage in 
discrimination and even if the Union had not engaged in this conduct on any other 
occasion than the one in question.  See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006); see also Steele v. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). 
 40. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 41. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1357, at 417 (3d ed. 2004) (“[F]or purposes of the motion to dismiss, 
(1) the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,  
(2) its allegations are taken as true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the pleading are drawn in favor of the pleader.”). 
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quote and the “fair notice” quote.42  But there is more to the spiel, 
only some of which finds roots in Conley. 
a. The “extraordinary” nature of 12(b)(6) motions 
Courts’ descriptions of the governing standards often open with a 
statement that 12(b)(6) motions are “rarely granted”43 and “only in 
‘extraordinary’ cases”44 because a complaint’s threshold for 
sufficiency is “exceedingly low.”45  Although this may once have been 
an accurate assessment,46 it is now a gross understatement of the 
efficacy of 12(b)(6) motions. 
b. The plaintiff gets the benefit of the doubt 
The boilerplate language also usually contains the principle that 
the court should give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on a 
12(b)(6) motion.47  This concept is expressed in various formulations, 
such as that the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
plaintiff”48 or must view the complaint’s allegations “in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff”49 or that the complaint must be “liberally 
construed in favor of the plaintiff.”50  However, these liberal 
inferences have a limit:  “unwarranted” factual inferences and 
deductions are insufficient.51 
                                                          
 42. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 590–91 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(referencing immediately the “no set of facts” and “fair notice” requirements 
established in Conley at the beginning of the discussion section); Bodine Produce, 
Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 556 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). 
 43. E.g., Lightfoot v. OBIM Fresh Cut Fruit Co., No. 4:07-CV-608-BE, 2008 WL 
4449512, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2008). 
 44. E.g., Feregrino v. Micro Focus (US) Inc., No. 08cv2026 JM(JMA), 2009 WL 
33308, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009). 
 45. E.g., Rivers v. Residential Servs. Group, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-84-T-30TBM, 2008 
WL 2776250, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2008). 
 46. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at 565 (“[R]elatively few complaints 
fail to meet this liberal [pleading] standard . . . .”). 
 47. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“[I]t is well established 
that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the 
complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”). 
 48. E.g., King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 49. E.g., Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 50. E.g., Lowery v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 51. See, e.g., Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that such conclusions “masquerad[e] as facts” and alone are insufficient to 
prevent dismissal); Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 
1987) (acknowledging that the court need not give weight to overly tenuous factual 
inferences in considering motions to dismiss). 
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c. Pro se plaintiffs get even more benefit of the doubt 
Pro se complaints are also supposed to be construed liberally,52 
although it is unclear how this standard differs from that applied to 
plaintiffs represented by counsel.  Other formulations are that pro se 
complaints should be “interpret[ed] charitably”53 and dismissed  
“only in the most unsustainable of cases.”54 
d. The complaint does not have to identify the legal name for the claim 
 it is attempting to assert 
Probably stemming from the pro se plaintiff’s unintentionally 
hilarious efforts in Dioguardi v. Durning,55 courts have explained that 
“[t]here is no rule that requires a complaint to allege the statutory 
basis upon which a cause of action is founded.”56  As Judge Posner 
pointed out, Rule 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint must set 
forth its legal basis; but once the complaint is challenged on a 
12(b)(6) motion, the pleader must identify some legal basis.57  Courts 
are not inclined to root out the right cause of action for the plaintiff. 
e. The “conclusory” conundrum 
An important part of the boilerplate language refers to the court’s 
obligation on a 12(b)(6) motion to credit as true the complaint’s 
factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.  It is difficult to 
discern the origins of this notion in modern federal practice.  Conley 
                                                          
 52. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that a complaint filed pro se, 
“however inartfully pleaded,” is considered less stringently than pleadings filed with 
the aid of counsel (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972))). 
 53. E.g., Williams v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411, 1417 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992) (reading 
the complaint in light of the plaintiff’s history of mental health problems); see also 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (providing the pro se plaintiff with an 
opportunity to offer proof in support of his claim for relief despite the Court’s 
inability to “say with assurance” that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to entitle 
him to relief). 
 54. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant # 1, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 55. 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (highlighting portions of the pro se plaintiff’s 
complaint—regarding a customs officer’s seizure of plaintiff’s “medicinal tonics” and 
subsequent sale at auction—which contained such gems as, “It isnt [sic] so easy to do 
away with two cases with 37 bottles of one quart.  Being protected, they can take this 
chance.”). 
 56. E.g., Darnell v. Hoelscher, Inc., No. 09-cv-204-JPG, 2009 WL 1768655, at *2 
(S.D. Ill. June 23, 2009); see, e.g., Daniels v. USS Agri-Chemicals, 965 F.2d 376 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (concluding that under federal and state pleading, the plaintiff need not 
include any theory of the case in a notice pleading system). 
 57. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that it is unresponsive for a plaintiff to refuse to offer the basis of a 
complaint after a defendant has presented a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 
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mentioned nothing about it; nor do the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The rule that legal conclusions are not accepted as true probably 
reaches back to code pleading, under which “legal conclusions” were 
not accepted as true on a demurrer (the code pleading forerunner to 
a 12(b)(6) motion).58  The concept is sensible when the alleged 
“conclusion” is a fanciful misstatement of the law or a misapplication 
of the law to the facts.  Take the following conclusion for example:  
“My roommate, the defendant, did not do his laundry for three 
months.  Therefore, he has committed the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”  In such a situation, the court would 
ignore its role as the gatekeeper of substantive law if it credited the 
legal conclusion of the “tort.” 
Whatever its source, the dividing line between allegations accepted 
and not accepted as true has been phrased in a myriad of ways.59  The 
characterization of allegations accepted as true has run the gamut 
from “all allegations”60 to “all material allegations”61 to “facts”62 to  
“all factual allegations”63 to “all well-pleaded factual allegations.”64  
The characterization of allegations that a court is not bound to 
accept as true has ranged from “legal conclusions”65 to “sweeping 
legal conclusions”66 to “bare assertion[s]”67 to “bare assertion[s] of 
legal conclusions”68 to “bald assertions [and] unsupportable 
conclusions”69 to “conclusory allegations”70 to “conclusory recitations 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762, 765 (N.C. 1963). 
 59. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at 504–21 (“Nothing appears to turn 
on the differences in these semantic formulations of the standard.”). 
 60. E.g., Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 61. E.g., Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 62. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 792 (2009) 
(“Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), we assume the truth of the facts as alleged in petitioners’ 
complaint.”). 
 63. E.g., Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazen, 570 F.3d 520, 523  
(3d Cir. 2009). 
 64. E.g., Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).  The phrase “well-pleaded facts” simply seems to be a 
tautological description of allegations that are not conclusory. 
 65. E.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 66. E.g., Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 67. E.g., Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2007). 
 68. E.g., Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 
(6th Cir. 1993). 
 69. E.g., Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 70. E.g., Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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of law”71 to “legal conclusion[s] couched as [or ‘masquerading as’] 
fact[s]”72 to my personal favorite, “periphrastic circumlocutions.”73 
The near-impossibility of distinguishing “conclusion” from “fact” is 
nicely illustrated by the 1986 case of Papasan v. Allain.74  By the time 
this case was decided, the rule that “for the purposes of this motion 
to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true, [but] we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 
couched as a factual allegation”75 was set in stone.  The Court applied 
this rule to the complaint’s allegation that due to disparities in 
government funding, schoolchildren in the Chickasaw Counties had 
been deprived of a “minimally adequate education,” and rejected the 
allegation as conclusory: 
The petitioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw 
Counties are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that 
they receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they 
allege no actual facts in support of their assertion that they have 
been deprived of a minimally adequate education.  As we see it, we 
are not bound to credit and may disregard the allegation that the 
petitioners have been denied a minimally adequate education.76 
Contrast another of the complaint’s allegations which satisfied the 
Papasan Court as not too conclusory:  “The allegations of the 
complaint are that the State is distributing the income from . . . lands 
or funds unequally among the school districts, to the detriment of 
the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students.”77  The Court did 
not decry the lack of “actual facts in support of” plaintiffs’ assertion of 
“detriment.”78  Could not the alleged “detriment” just have been the 
Trojan Horse version of the lack of “minimally adequate education” 
that had already been rejected?  It is unclear why the first allegation is 
conclusory and the second is not.79 
                                                          
 71. E.g., Zelenka v. NFI Indus., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 72. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (“[W]e are not bound to 
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”); Mezibov v. Allen, 
411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[L]egal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”). 
 73. E.g., Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 74. 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
 75. Id. at 286. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 287–88. 
 78. Id. at 286. 
 79. In another recent example of the invisible line between “conclusions” and 
“facts,” one court rejected a claim because the claim only contained a “single, 
conclusory assertion that [the defendant] ‘sought . . . to appropriate and disclose the 
names of [plaintiff’s] customers.’”  All Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. NationsLine, Inc., 629  
F. Supp. 2d 553, 558–59 (W.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Plaintiff’s Second Amended 
Complaint ¶ 23).  Should the plaintiff have described how the defendant broke into 
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As another example of the conclusory facts dilemma, Justice 
Stevens and other scholars have pointed out that the judicial refusal 
to credit a “conclusory” allegation as true on a 12(b)(6) motion is 
seemingly inconsistent with the conclusory nature of the official 
forms following the FRCP, which “suffice under these rules and 
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”80  
For example, Form 11, a complaint for negligence, states in its 
operative entirety, “On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove 
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” and then proceeds to allege 
damages.81  How can Form 11’s allegation that “the defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff”82 not be a 
conclusion, whether of fact or law?  Justice Stevens thinks it is a “bare 
allegation,” but one that is acceptable on a 12(b)(6) motion;83 Justice 
Souter is satisfied that the allegation as a whole is not conclusory 
because it gives a date, a time, and a place.84 
The problem is that one person’s “conclusion” is another person’s 
“fact.”85  The continuing debate demonstrates exactly why the drafters 
of the FRCP intended to sweep away the failed code-pleading 
attempts to distinguish “evidence” from “ultimate facts” and 
“conclusions.” 
3. The resistance to “notice pleading” 
In the years before Twombly, the Court tried to slap down any 
pleading standard that lower courts had the audacity to call 
“heightened” in relation to the general notice pleading standard of 
Rule 8(a)(2).  In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit,86 the Court reversed the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to impose an explicitly 
“heightened pleading standard” applied to claims against 
                                                          
its office and stole a Rolodex, or how the defendant copied computer files, and gave 
them to a competitor? 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 84; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Twombly majority’s inconsistency with 
the hypothetical pleadings in Form 9 of the FRCP); Bone, supra note 14, at 875 & n.4 
(noting that courts have departed from the “liberal ethos” of the FRCP). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (formerly Form 9). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 565 n.10 (majority opinion) (“A defendant wishing to prepare an 
answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer;  
a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations in the § 1 context 
would have little idea where to begin.”). 
 85. See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK 
§ 72, at 635 (2002) (“[T]he distinction between facts and conclusions is one of 
degree only, not of kind.”). 
 86. 507 U.S. 162 (1993). 
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municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.87  In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A.,88 the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s imposition of a “prima 
facie case” pleading standard applied to employment discrimination 
claims.89  These were easy cases given the structure of the FRCP.  Rule 
9(b) imposes only a “particularity” requirement in pleading claims of 
“fraud or mistake,”90 so every claim that is not for “fraud or mistake” 
falls within 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement” requirement.91 
But lower courts continued to attempt to evade the notice pleading 
standard, virtually ignoring Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.92  For 
example, despite Leatherman, some courts continued to apply an 
explicit “heightened pleading” standard to § 1983 complaints 
brought against an individual defendant, especially when the 
defendant asserted the defense of qualified immunity with a 
subjective intent element93 or when the plaintiff alleged supervisory 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 164–65. 
 88. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 89. Id. at 509–10. 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 91. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512–13. 
 92. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 987 (2003) (discussing the regularity with which district courts avoided the 
simplified pleading standard in favor of consolidating an ever-growing federal 
docket). 
 93. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003)  
(“In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must keep in mind the 
heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those involving the 
defense of qualified immunity.”); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that although Rule 8(a)(2) governs, “[p]laintiffs suing governmental 
officials in their individual capacities . . . must allege specific conduct giving rise to a 
constitutional violation”); Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 
2000) (explaining that when a qualified immunity defense is asserted, the court will 
“apply a heightened pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain ‘specific, 
non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine 
that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively 
reasonable in light of clearly established law’” (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond,  
155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998))); see also Truvia v. Julien, 187 F. App’x 346, 348 
(5th Cir. 2006) (calling the proscription in Oliver an imposition of a “heightened 
pleading standard”).  Contra Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 294 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(refusing to “apply [the] heightened pleading standard in cases in which a 
defendant pleads qualified immunity”); Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. 
Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting any heightened pleading 
standard in federal civil rights actions unless the FRCP specifically impose such a 
standard); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reviewing the history of the heightened pleading standard and finding that the 
heightened pleading of a defendant’s improper motive in constitutional tort cases is 
no longer required); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 914–16 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that courts may no longer impose a heightened pleading requirement for 
cases in which the defendant officially raised the defense of qualified immunity after 
finding no support for such an imposition from federal statutory law or from the 
FRCP); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the 
“heightened pleading standard is a departure from the usual pleading requirements 
of [Rules] 8 and 9(b)” (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring))). 
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liability.94  In addition, despite Swierkiewicz, some lower courts 
continued to apply a “prima facie case” pleading requirement in 
employment discrimination cases.95 
Even if they did not use the term “heightened,” courts still 
attempted to accomplish the same result by different means.  The 
method of choice was the prohibition against “conclusory” 
allegations, especially in civil rights cases. 
Justifications for tightening up “notice pleading” in civil rights 
cases usually focused on the disruption to government operations 
that could result from a flood of meritless cases and government 
officials’ entitlement through qualified immunity to  protection from 
litigation as well as from liability.96  With this study, I quantified a part 
of the problem:  constitutional civil rights cases accounted for 32% of 
the 12(b)(6) motions in the Database.97  I discovered another facet of 
the civil rights problem after reading hundreds of cases for this study:  
I began to experience a sinking feeling every time I came across a 
constitutional civil rights case—particularly, but not exclusively, with 
a pro se plaintiff—for I knew there was a good chance the claims 
would be jumbled, the number of defendants massive, the legal 
theories botched,98 and the story sad.  Perhaps similar sentiments—in 
addition to the oft-stated concerns about litigation disrupting daily 
government operations—have motivated federal courts to adopt a 
more scrutinizing approach throughout the tortured history of 
pleading standards in civil rights cases. 
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)  
(“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged 
wrongs . . . .  Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal 
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.  Allegations of participation or 
actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate 
particularity.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Lynn v. Tobin, No. 07-1622, 2009 
WL 1971430, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (“The Third Circuit has adopted a specific 
pleading standard for civil rights claims.”). 
 95. E.g., Totten v. Norton, 421 F. Supp. 2d 115, 120 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 96. For a discussion of the arguments for and against a heightened pleading 
standard in civil rights cases from a critical race theory perspective, see Roy L. Brooks, 
Critical Race Theory:  A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 107–10 (1994). 
 97. See infra Figure 4. 
 98. In legions of cases, plaintiffs appear to be unaware of a host of legal 
principles including:  the doctrine of sovereign immunity; the difference between  
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; the inability of municipalities to be sued on a 
respondeat superior theory; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Many civil rights plaintiffs 
also fail to understand the redundancy in filing claims against a government 
employee in his or her “official capacity” and the governmental entity; when to use 
the Eighth versus the Fourteenth Amendment in claims of deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs; and when exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. 
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B. The New “Plausibility” Standard:  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
Twombly had its genesis in the break-up of AT&T’s local telephone 
business into the “Baby Bells,” also known as Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”).99  The Telecommunications Act of 
1996100 sought to facilitate competition in local telephone service by 
permitting Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) to use 
networks belonging to ILECs.101  The Twombly plaintiffs, representing 
a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone or high-speed 
internet service from 1996 onward,102 sued the ILECs, including Bell 
Atlantic, for antitrust violations under the Sherman Act,103 which 
prohibits a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce.”104 
The complaint alleged that the defendant ILECs engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct through (1) their “parallel conduct” in 
adopting certain practices that discouraged competition from the 
CLECs, and (2) their failure to compete with each other in local 
service in their respective service areas.105  However, taken alone, this 
conduct was not sufficient for liability under the Sherman Act, which 
requires an anticompetitive agreement or conspiracy among the 
defendants.  The complaint therefore attempted to allege the critical 
element of “agreement” or “conspiracy” in several ways. 
First, the complaint alleged that the ILECs stayed out of each 
other’s territory even when one ILEC’s geographic operating area 
surrounded another ILEC’s operating area.  For example, defendant 
ILEC SBC served California and Nevada, but defendant ILEC Qwest 
served all the states bordering California and Nevada.106  In this 
context, the complaint alleged: 
Richard Notebaert, the former Chief Executive Officer of 
Ameritech, who sold the company to Defendant SBC in 1999 and 
who currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant 
                                                          
 99. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). 
 100. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 47 U.S.C.). 
 101. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549. 
 102. Id. at 550.  The complaint was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs by the former 
law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP.  Unfortunately for the 
plaintiffs, former partners of Milberg Weiss were indicted around the time the case 
was heard in the Supreme Court.  See Julie Creswell, Partner at Law Firm Resigns to 
Focus on Criminal Charges Against Him, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at C3. 
 103. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2006)). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 105. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51. 
 106. Complaint ¶ 37, at 12, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-cv-10220-GEL), 2003 WL 25753160. 
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Qwest, was quoted in a Chicago Tribune article as saying it would be 
fundamentally wrong to compete in the SBC/Ameritech territory, 
adding “it might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that 
doesn’t make it right.”107 
The complaint alleged further that congressional representatives 
and other persons considered Notebaert’s statement evidence of an 
anticompetitive conspiracy.108 
Second, the complaint alleged that “[e]laborate” or “frequent 
communications” among the ILECs to agree to allocate markets 
would not have been necessary because “four defendants . . . 
account[ed] for as much as ninety percent or more of the markets 
for local telephone services within the 48 contiguous states.”109  The 
complaint also alleged that the ILECs did “indeed communicate 
amongst themselves through a myriad of organizations, including but 
not limited to the United States Telecom Association, the 
TeleMessaging Industry Association, the Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Telecordia, Alliance for 
Public Technology, the Telecommunications Industry Association 
and the Progress and Freedom Foundation.”110 
In support of its allegation that the “[d]efendants ha[d] engaged 
in parallel conduct in order to prevent competition,” the complaint 
provided twelve examples of wrongful acts in which all the ILECs had 
engaged.111  These acts included double-billing the CLEC’s customers 
who converted from an ILEC and failing to provide a quality 
interconnection between the network and those of competitors.112 
With this background, the complaint then alleged: 
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the 
[ILECs] in one another’s markets, and in light of the parallel 
course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition 
from CLECs . . . .  Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that 
Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or 
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local 
                                                          
 107. Id. ¶ 42, at 14. 
 108. The Illinois Coalition For Competitive Telecom allegedly characterized 
Notebaert’s reported statement as “evidence of potential collusion among regional 
Bell phone monopolies to not compete against one another and kill off potential 
competitors in local phone service.”  Id. ¶ 44, at 14.  Further, after Notebaert’s 
reported statement, U.S. Representatives John Conyers and Zoe Lofgren allegedly 
asked the Antitrust Division to “investigate whether the [ILECs] are violating the 
antitrust laws by carving up their market territories and deliberately refraining from 
competing with one another.”  Id. ¶ 45, at 15. 
 109. Id. ¶ 48, at 18. 
 110. Id. ¶ 46, at 15. 
 111. Id. ¶ 47(a)–(l), at 15–18. 
 112. Id. 
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telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and have 
agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated 
customers and markets to one another.113 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion.114  The Second 
Circuit reversed, holding that under the “no set of facts” test from 
Conley, the complaint stated a claim for relief.115 
The Supreme Court reversed.  The majority, in an opinion by 
Justice Souter, began with Rule 8(a)(2) and the “fair notice” quote 
from Conley.116  It continued with another part of the 12(b)(6) spiel:  
factual allegations, but not legal conclusions, are accepted as true, 
“even if doubtful.”117 
But the Court left out a key piece of the boilerplate language.   
It said nothing about how a plaintiff on a 12(b)(6) motion was to get 
the benefit of the doubt.  There were no admonishments to draw all 
reasonable inferences, or liberally construe the allegations in the 
plaintiff’s favor. 
Instead, it dropped the “plausibility” bombshell: 
[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.  
Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be 
dismissed.118 
The Court explained that requiring “plausible grounds” for relief 
was not a “probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged wrongdoing.119  This 
expectation was particularly important in an antitrust case, where 
discovery can be massive and ruinously expensive. 
The Court’s opinion was short on explaining the criteria by which 
plausibility was to be judged.120  Apparently, “plausible” is more than 
“possible” but less than “probable.”121  In addition, Justice Souter 
                                                          
 113. Id. ¶ 51, at 19. 
 114. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 115. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 116. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 117. Id. at 555–57. 
 118. Id. at 570. 
 119. Id. at 556. 
 120. Cf. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“Some improbable 
allegations might properly be disposed of on summary judgment, but to dismiss 
them as frivolous without any factual development is to disregard the age-old insight 
that many allegations might be ‘strange, but true; for truth is always strange, Stranger 
than fiction.’” (citation omitted)). 
 121. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
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suggested that plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy against the ILECs 
should be judged “in light of common economic experience.”122   
The Court did not attempt to define the group for which the 
economic experience would be “common,” whether it be economists, 
monopolists, consumers, judges, Americans, or some other cohort. 
Applying the “plausibility” standard, the Court noted that the 
alleged parallel conduct among the ILECs and their failure to 
compete with one another was consistent with legal behavior.123   
The complaint’s “stray” allegations of illegal “agreement” among the 
ILECs were mere legal conclusions.124  “[W]hen viewed in light of 
common economic experience,”125 the defendants’ acting to keep out 
the CLECs was just “the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC 
intent on keeping its regional dominance.”126  “[A]n obvious 
alternative explanation” for defendants’ failure to compete with each 
other was that they were born-and-bred monopolists.127  Thus, the 
Court held, nothing in the complaint made its conclusory allegations 
of an illegal “agreement” among defendants “plausible.”128 
Along the way, the Court held that the “no set of facts” standard 
from Conley “ha[d] earned its retirement”129: 
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard:  once a claim has been stated 
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.130 
The Court mistakenly cited Swierkiewicz, among other cases, for this 
proposition.131  In fact, Swierkiewicz stated the proposition thus:  
“Given the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading, ‘[a] court 
may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be 
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the 
allegations.’”132  There is no difference between the “no set of facts” 
rule and the “any set of facts” rule—indeed, two of the cases Conley 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 565. 
 123. Id. at 554. 
 124. Id. at 564. 
 125. Id. at 565. 
 126. Id. at 566. 
 127. Id. at 567–68. 
 128. Id. at 564–65. 
 129. Id. at 563. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 504, 514 (2002)). 
 132. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). 
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cited for the “no set of facts” principle actually used the language 
“any state of facts.”133 
Two weeks after Twombly, the Court issued a per curiam opinion, 
Erickson v. Pardus,134 in which it rejected the argument that a 
prisoner’s civil rights complaint for deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs was too conclusory.135  Erickson cited Twombly only for 
the “fair notice” part of Conley and the standard proposition that  
“a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in 
the complaint” on a 12(b)(6) motion.136  The Court did not even 
refer to the “plausibility” standard, reinforcing speculation that 
“plausibility” was confined to the antitrust context. 
Twombly, however, garnered much more attention than Erickson.  
Some commentators expressed concern that Twombly constituted 
improper judicial activism, was inconsistent with the merits focus of 
the FRCP, and might further erode access to justice.137  Others 
claimed that Twombly was either correctly decided on its facts, 
clarified existing principles, or would not have a significant practical 
effect on rulings.138 
                                                          
 133. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 n.5 (citing Cont’l Collieries, Inc. v. 
Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942)) (explaining that a case may not be 
dismissed unless it appears that a plaintiff cannot prevail under “any state of facts”); 
Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1940)  
(“[W]e think there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of 
statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled 
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.”).  
Nevertheless, some courts continue to favorably cite the “any set of facts” rule after 
Twombly.  E.g., Torres v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-98J, 2009 WL 1322564, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 
May 12, 2009); Gregory Surgical Servs., LLC v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
N.J., Inc., No. 06-0462 (JAG), 2009 WL 749795, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2009); Zawacki 
v. Realogy Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 (D. Conn. 2009).  Notably, at least one 
court has continued this trend even after Iqbal.  E.g., Ahern v. Omnicare ESC LLC, 
No. 5:08-CV-291-FL, 2009 WL 2591320, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2009). 
 134. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). 
 135. Id. at 93. 
 136. Id. at 93–94. 
 137. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:  A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–16 (2009) 
(examining dismissal rates of employment discrimination cases before and after 
Twombly and recommending a more cautious use of the “plausibility” standard);  
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453–54 (2008) 
(arguing that the rule amendment process is the proper way to change pleading 
requirements). 
 138. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 889 (“Most complaints that pass muster under 
notice pleading should also pass muster under plausibility pleading.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:  How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary 
Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007) (applauding the result of Twombly, 
but not the underlying analysis, for preventing futile and expensive discovery); 
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2009) 
(finding Twombly’s standard “relatively clear” and mandated by the Federal Rules). 
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Both sides had a point.  On the one hand, when a pleading’s 
sufficiency as a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief” under Rule 8(a)(2) has been interpreted 
for fifty years under the “no set of facts” standard, suddenly 
substituting a “plausibility” standard looks very much like an end-run 
around the constraints on the judiciary’s rule-making power.139   
In addition, whatever the practical effect of the change, the two 
standards have very different aspirational connotations:  to allow a 
complaint to stand unless “no set of facts” would support it suggests 
an intent to err on the side of upholding the pleading; to require a 
complaint to be “plausible on its face” suggests a more suspicious 
attitude towards pleadings.  On the other hand, the lower federal 
courts have been chafing at the “notice pleading” standard for 
decades, particularly in civil rights cases, and numerous opinions, law 
review articles, and treatises have counseled that the Conley “no set of 
facts” standard is “somewhat hyperbolic” and is not to be applied 
literally.140 
Meanwhile, most federal courts of appeals seemingly sided with the 
more sanguine view of Twombly, concluding that it did not 
considerably alter the pleading standard.141  Instead, Twombly was 
described as imposing “two easy-to-clear hurdles”:  notice to the 
defendant and plausibility.142  Nonetheless, the exhortation that the 
allegations must support a claim that is “plausible on its face” smacks 
of weighing evidence or of disbelieving the complaint’s allegations, 
                                                          
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–74 (2006) (prescribing the 
procedure by which the Supreme Court shall make the FRCP, including submission 
to Congress before becoming effective). 
 140. Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749, 1750 (1998); see, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[T]he exceedingly forgiving attitude towards pleading deficiencies . . . in 
Conley v. Gibson . . . has never been taken literally.”); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., 
N.A., 909 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D. Minn. 1995) (“[T]he [‘no set of facts’] phrase is not 
applied literally . . . .”). 
 141. E.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court never said that it intended a drastic change in the law, and 
indeed strove to convey the opposite impression . . . .”); Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 
202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Twombly does not significantly alter the 
lenient, notice-focused standard used to assess the complaint of a pro se litigant); 
Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 296 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(acknowledging circuit courts’ interpretations of Twombly that “did not significantly 
alter notice pleading”).  But see St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 263 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (“Twombly jettisoned the minimum notice pleading requirements of Conley 
v. Gibson.”); Morgan v. Hanna Holdings, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (W.D. Pa. 
2009) (“[Twombly] required a heightened degree of fact pleading in an anti-trust 
case.”). 
 142. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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neither of which may be done on a 12(b)(6) motion.143  At least one 
court’s misquoting of the new standard as requiring “enough 
plausible facts” illustrates the misunderstanding that the word may 
generate.144 
C. Twombly on Steroids:  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Twombly’s “plausibility” standard was new and startling, but left 
most of the 12(b)(6) spiel intact, and, like it or not, can fairly be seen 
as better enunciating what lower courts were already doing, given 
their mistrust of notice pleading.  Iqbal is a different story. 
Javaid Iqbal’s complaint grew out of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (“FBI”) massive investigation following the September 
11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaida on the World Trade Center and other 
targets.145  Iqbal alleged that “all Arab Muslim men [within the New 
York area] arrested on criminal or immigration charges while the FBI 
was following an investigative lead into the September 11th attacks—
however unrelated the arrestee was to the investigation—were 
immediately classified as ‘of interest’ to the post-September-11th 
investigation.”146 
Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was one of those men.  Charged on 
November 5, 2001, with fraud in connection with identification 
documents, he alleged that he and other Muslim men were classified 
as persons “of high interest” based solely on their race, national 
origin, and religion.147  As such, he was confined in a hastily 
constructed post-September-11th maximum security unit at the 
                                                          
 143. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989) (citations omitted) 
(“What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s 
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974) (“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the 
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.  Indeed it may appear on 
the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not 
the test.”); Hansen v. Native Am. Refinery Co., No. 2:06cv00109, 2007 WL 1108776, 
at *3 (D. Utah Apr. 10, 2007) (“A court evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion should not 
‘weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but [should] assess 
whether the plaintiff’s claim alone is legally sufficient’ to provide relief.” (quoting 
Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 
1999))). 
 144. Halpin v. David, No. 4:06cv457-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 789684, at *3 (N.D. Fla. 
Mar. 20, 2009). 
 145. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009).  Iqbal had a co-plaintiff, Ehad Elmaghraby, who settled with the United 
States for $300,000 after the district court denied most of the defendants’ 12(b)(6) 
motions.  Id. at 147. 
 146. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04:CV-01809 JS SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (citation omitted). 
 147. Id. at *1 & n.1. 
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Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“ADMAX SHU”).148  
Conditions in the ADMAX SHU were brutal:  beatings and repeated 
body-cavity searches; inadequate food, heat, and medical care; twenty-
three-hour-a-day solitary lockdown; interference with religious 
practices and right to counsel; and ethnic insults.149  Yet Iqbal alleged 
he was not “afforded the opportunity to contest his classification or 
continued confinement in the ADMAX SHU,” where he was kept for 
over six months, even after pleading guilty to the underlying criminal 
charges.150 
After his removal to Pakistan,151 Iqbal filed a twenty-one-count 
complaint asserting, among other things, Bivens claims152 against John 
Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the United States, Robert 
Mueller, Director of the FBI, and numerous other supervisory and 
non-supervisory government officials.153  Ashcroft and Mueller, along 
with many other supervisory defendants, moved to dismiss on the 
grounds of qualified immunity and that the allegations of 
participatory conduct by Ashcroft and Mueller were too 
“conclusory.”154 
The district court, citing Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, denied 
most of Ashcroft and Mueller’s motions to dismiss.155  But by the time 
the case reached the Second Circuit on defendants’ interlocutory 
appeal, Twombly had intervened.  Struggling mightily to reconcile the 
“conflicting signals” in Twombly itself as well as to navigate the morass 
created by recent Supreme Court pleadings decisions, the Second 
Circuit concluded:  “[W]e believe the Court is not requiring a 
universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead 
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to 
amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where 
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”156 
                                                          
 148. Id. at *2 & n.5. 
 149. Id. at *3–7. 
 150. Id. at *1 & n.1. 
 151. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009). 
 152. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,  
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action against federal officers for 
constitutional violations). 
 153. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 154. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10, *20. 
 155. Id. at *35 (denying motion to dismiss claims of violation of Fifth Amendment 
procedural due process, discrimination on the basis of religion and race under the 
First and Fifth Amendments, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). 
 156. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009). 
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Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that no further 
amplification was needed to render most of the claims “plausible.”157  
The court did dismiss the procedural due process claims against 
Ashcroft and Mueller, but left the First Amendment, Equal 
Protection, and § 1985 claims intact.158 
The Supreme Court majority, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, 
reversed the Second Circuit.159  In so doing, it espoused an 
extraordinary interpretation of Twombly and federal pleading 
practice—refuted bitterly in dissent by Justice Souter, the author of 
the two-year-old Twombly.160 
The Court began with Rule 8(a)(2), but then omitted most of the 
rest of the 12(b)(6) boilerplate language.  Remarkably, the Court 
never once referred to “notice pleading,” conspicuously failing to 
even cite the Conley “fair notice” language preserved in Twombly 
(Justice Souter, in dissent, cited the “fair notice” standard).161   
The Court also eschewed citation of Swierkiewicz or Leatherman, both 
of which upheld “notice pleading” against creeping “heightened 
pleading.”  In fact, the Court did not expressly reject “heightened 
pleading,” as Justice Souter had been careful to do in Twombly.162   
Also absent was any mention of giving the plaintiff the benefit of the 
doubt or that all reasonable inferences should be made in the 
plaintiff’s favor. 
Instead, the Court turned to the Twombly “plausible on its face” 
standard.163  It brushed aside any doubt that the standard was to be 
applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust cases.164  The Court then 
elaborated, “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”165 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 166 (“[A]ll of the Plaintiff’s allegations respecting the personal 
involvement of these Defendants are entirely plausible, without allegations of 
additional subsidiary facts.”). 
 158. Id. at 177–78. 
 159. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941, 1954 (2009). 
 160. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 1961. 
 162. Compare id. at 1949–50 (majority opinion) (suggesting that a pleading must 
contain factual enhancement and noting that a court can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that are not entitled to the assumption of truth), with Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any ‘heightened’ 
pleading standard . . . .”). 
 163. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 164. Id. at 1953. 
 165. Id. at 1950. 
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Applying its own judicial experience and common sense, the 
Second Circuit had found Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller 
plausible.166  The Supreme Court majority did not; it held that the 
complaint did not “contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners 
purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 
detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or 
national origin.”167  Therefore, the Court held, the “complaint 
fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and 
unlawful discrimination against petitioners.”168 
The applications of the “plausibility” standard by the Supreme 
Court majority and the Second Circuit in Iqbal illustrate how 
rudderless a guide that standard is.  For the Second Circuit, what 
made the alleged discriminatory policy “plausible” was the 
unprecedented national security crisis on American soil.169  The same 
national security crisis, for the Supreme Court majority, was what 
made legitimate law enforcement purposes for the policy more 
“likely” than purposeful discrimination, thus rendering purposeful 
discrimination implausible.170 
One can only imagine Justice Souter’s distress over the majority’s 
makeover of the “plausibility” standard.  He reminded the Court that 
Twombly involved allegations that were consistent with both legal and 
illegal conduct, but that in Iqbal, “the allegations in the complaint . . . 
[were not] consistent with legal conduct.”171  Further, he was reduced 
to explaining elementary 12(b)(6) principles: 
Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to 
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. . . . The 
sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently 
fantastic to defy reality as we know it:  claims about little green 
men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time 
travel.172   
Far from embodying a notice pleading standard, Iqbal’s 
interpretation of “plausibility” is equivalent to the “strong inference 
of scienter” standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
                                                          
 166. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 166 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 167. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952. 
 168. Id. at 1954. 
 169. See Hasty, 490 F.3d at 166, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering the likelihood 
that senior officials would concern themselves with the formulation and 
implementation of such policies). 
 170. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52 (choosing the “obvious alternative 
explanation” that the arrest was based on potential terrorist connections). 
 171. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 1959. 
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Act (PSLRA)173—a heightened-plus pleading standard recently 
described by the Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.174  
Just as the Court in Tellabs compared opposing inferences of lawful 
and unlawful intent on a motion to dismiss under the PSLRA, the 
Court in Iqbal compared opposing inferences of lawful and unlawful 
intent on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller, and found the inference 
of lawful intent more “likely.”175 
But the opinion did not stop there.  The majority kept only one 
part of the 12(b)(6) spiel, which it raised to new heights:  the 
principle that legal conclusions should not be accepted as true on a 
12(b)(6) motion.  The majority explained: 
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While 
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations.  When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should [1] assume their veracity 
and [2] then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief. . . . Our decision in Twombly illustrates [this] 
two-pronged approach.176 
Thus, Iqbal invites judges to bifurcate the analysis:  eliminate from 
consideration all the complaint’s conclusory allegations (whatever 
that means) and then judge the complaint’s remaining allegations 
under the “common sense” “plausibility” standard.  Far from 
acknowledging that the so-called “two-pronged approach” constitutes 
a radical change, the Court implied that Twombly had explicitly and 
intentionally applied this “approach.” 
This was disingenuous.177  The Twombly Court did call the 
complaint’s allegations of an “agreement” among the defendants a 
“legal conclusion”—with which one could reasonably disagree.178   
                                                          
 173. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 174. 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s requirement that the 
complaint in a securities fraud case “state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,” to mean 
that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it 
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
 175. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 176. Id. at 1950. 
 177. None of the 422 cases decided under Twombly that I reviewed for this study 
applied anything like the “two-pronged approach” so allegedly plain from Twombly. 
 178. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (stating that the 
allegation of an actual agreement was merely a legal conclusion resting on prior 
allegations). 
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But it did not banish the allegations from consideration.179  And even 
assuming that the allegation of an agreement in Twombly was a “legal 
conclusion,” this would have made no difference in Iqbal because the 
Court in that case did not characterize Iqbal’s allegations as “legal 
conclusions.”  The Court called the rejected allegations in Iqbal “bare 
assertions,” “formulaic recitations of the elements,” “bald 
allegations,” and “conclusory.”180  Because it places no limit on what a 
judge may or may not accept as true, or what it may or may not call a 
legal conclusion, Iqbal opens the door for much wider rejection, on 
an ill-defined basis, of a plaintiff’s allegations on a defendant’s 
12(b)(6) motion. 
Citing only the near-incomprehensible case of Papasin v. Allain,181 
the Court provided no workable clarification of what is and is not 
“conclusory.”  Indeed, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
definitional ambiguity of “conclusory” that has plagued the 
profession for at least a century. 
The bankruptcy of the “conclusory allegation” label was 
demonstrated by the lower courts in Iqbal.  The Iqbal district court 
assumed “that plaintiffs’ [factual] allegations [were] true.”182  The 
district court noted only that “the parties disagree about how specific 
and ‘nonconclusory’ an allegation of personal involvement must be 
in order to survive a motion to dismiss where the defense of qualified 
immunity has been asserted,” but concluded that Swierkiewicz 
foreclosed any heightened pleading standard even in this situation.183  
The Second Circuit also credited all of the complaint’s allegations as 
true, even while calling some of the allegations “not entirely 
conclusory.”184 
The Supreme Court majority, on the other hand, shot so-called 
“conclusory” allegations out of the complaint like so many skeet,185 
                                                          
 179. See id. at 566–67 (holding that nothing contained in the complaint suggests a 
conspiracy, but acknowledging plaintiffs’ claims that collusion was necessary to cause 
success by even one CLEC and that the ILECs’ parallel conduct suggested 
conspiracy). 
 180. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 181. See 478 U.S. 265, 285–89 (1986) (holding that a claim challenging 
Mississippi’s distribution of public school land funds violated equal protection and 
was sufficient to state a claim if it was determined that the differential treatment was 
not rationally related to state interest). 
 182. Elamaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
 183. Id. at *11–12. 
 184. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 185. It rejected as “conclusory” the allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal]” to brutal 
conditions in ADMAX SHU “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, 
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest;” that 
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leaving a mere skeleton of “factual” allegations for the court to 
consider under the “plausibility” standard. 
Justice Souter, in dissent, disagreed that any of the complaint’s 
allegations were “conclusory,” and argued that there was “no 
principled basis” for the distinction that the majority made between 
conclusory and nonconclusory allegations.186  He considered the 
majority’s “singl[ing] out” of certain allegations “in isolation,” rather 
than viewing the complaint as a whole, a “fallacy.”187  But it was more 
than that; the majority’s decision overturned a long-accepted 
principle on 12(b)(6) motions that when considering a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “[v]iew[] the complaint 
as a whole, rather than any one statement in isolation.”188  Iqbal 
explicitly encourages judges to view the non-conclusory allegations in 
isolation from the conclusory allegations.  Just as juries are more 
likely to rule for the defendant if they have to use a special verdict or 
answer special interrogatories (rather than give a general verdict),189  
I can only see the “two-pronged approach” working in favor of 
defendants.190 
The courts of appeals have been quick to notice a sea change in 
Iqbal.191  So far, most district courts have not explicitly characterized 
Iqbal as a dramatic departure from earlier pleading standards.192   
                                                          
“Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy;” and that “Mueller was 
‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing [the scheme].”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 186. Id. at 1961 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
 187. Id. 
 188. E.g., Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
 189. Cf. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 368–70 (1995) (noting the plaintiff’s 
objections to the use of complicated special verdict forms because he felt it would 
negatively impact his chance at winning). 
 190. Cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Detailed Fact Pleading:  The Lessons of Scottish Civil 
Procedure, 36 INT’L LAW. 1185, 1201 (2002) (“Pleading specificity requirements are 
about limiting the scope of lawsuits from beginning to end.”). 
 191. See, e.g., McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
Iqbal’s clarification that Twombly applied to all cases, and citing the Iqbal “judicial 
experience and common sense” gloss on “plausibility”); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 
580–81 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the changes in evaluating motions to dismiss 
since Iqbal); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
that after Iqbal, “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice 
pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more 
than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss,” and concluding that 
Iqbal’s “two-part analysis” of first “separat[ing]” the “factual and legal elements of a 
claim” and “disregard[ing] any legal conclusions” and then applying the 
“plausibility” standard puts “the final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ 
standard”); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 
2009) (commenting that “[e]xactly how implausible is ‘implausible’ remains to be 
seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be worked out in practice,” and 
quoting the “judicial experience and common sense” language). 
 192. See, e.g., Robinson v. Beard, No. 08-3156, 2009 WL 2215088, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
July 22, 2009) (“Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule 
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As this Article will demonstrate in the following Parts, however, it 
appears that district courts after Iqbal are granting 12(b)(6) motions 
at a much higher rate than they did under either Conley or Twombly. 
Perhaps I am magnifying the importance of the “two-pronged 
approach.”  Only a minority of district courts citing Iqbal in the 
Database I constructed even mentioned the “two-pronged 
approach.”193  But the handful of courts that have literally applied the 
new standard are disconcerting.  In one case, the court excised 
“conclusions” from the complaint and held that the complaint’s 
allegations—that officers shot a man in the head in front of his wife 
while the man, without resisting the officers, was attempting to drive 
to work—did not state a claim.194  In another case, the court issued 
this non sequitur:  “Plaintiff makes multiple allegations that the Court 
considers to be legal conclusions that do not merit a presumption of 
truth—specifically, the numerous variations of the allegation that 
Joytoto sent (also transmitted, broadcasted, caused to be sent) the 
unsolicited fax.”195 
The fact that district courts rarely segregate “conclusions” in 
pleadings after Iqbal may simply be due to the nature of the task 
which can be highly time-consuming without counsel’s help.  As the 
defense bar absorbs Iqbal’s teaching, we may see more motions 
                                                          
12(b)(6) standard of review have remained static.”).  Of all the cases read for 
inclusion in the Database, only one expressly acknowledged a significant change 
wrought by Iqbal.  See Kyle v. Holinka, No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1  
(W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009).  In Kyle, a § 1983 case, Judge Crabb reconsidered a 
12(b)(6) motion that she had earlier denied.  Id.  She granted the motion under 
Iqbal, stating that Iqbal “implicitly overturned decades of circuit precedent in which 
the court of appeals had allowed discrimination claims to be pleaded in a conclusory 
fashion,” and that under Iqbal, “an allegation of discrimination needs to be more 
specific.”  Id.  Moreover, the application of Iqbal in some cases is confusing.   
For example, in Lynn v. Tobin, No. 07-1622, 2009 WL 1971430 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 
2009), the court found that the complaint’s allegations could “plausibly give rise to 
an entitlement to relief” under Iqbal, but that the allegations were not specific 
enough.  Id. at *3. 
 193. E.g., Mason v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 09-361(JLL), 2009 WL 2634871, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2009); Petrusa v. Suffolk County Soc’y for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals, No. 05-CV-6017 (DRH), 2009 WL 1796996, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 
24, 2009). 
 194. Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, No. C 08-5771 JF (PVT), 2009 WL 2160572, at *3, 
*4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2009). 
 195. Consumer Prot. Corp. v. Neo-Tech News, No. CV 08-1983-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 
2132694, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2009); see also Goliad County v. Uranium Energy 
Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688, at *10, *10 n.7, *11 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009) 
(holding in an environmental case that a plaintiff’s allegation that a defendant’s 
“pattern of intentional disregard of these plugging requirements is sufficient to lead 
to the inference of intent to emplace fluids in the subsurface” is a “conclusion of law” 
not required to be accepted as true under Iqbal, and dismissing the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
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assisting the judge in identifying so-called “conclusions” that should 
be ignored. 
One could also speculate that Iqbal, which involved a claim of 
qualified immunity at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, will 
be limited to its unusual political context and that it will be allowed to 
fade quietly into Bush v. Gore oblivion.196  The months after Iqbal, 
however, have refuted such speculation. 
D. Where We Are Now 
At this point, the law of pleading consists of pronouncements 
worthy of Lao-tzu197: 
Courts do not require “heightened specificity,” but “conclusions” 
are unacceptable.  Never mind that if the pleader is concerned that 
an allegation is “conclusory,” she would probably attempt to 
remedy it by making the allegation more specific. 
 
Plaintiffs must allege “facts,” but they need not be “detailed facts.” 
 
Courts may or may not be required to construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to a plaintiff, but courts certainly cannot 
grant a plaintiff “unwarranted” inferences of fact. 
 
Courts are not to weigh evidence, evaluate witness credibility, or 
judge the likelihood that a plaintiff will prevail at trial, but a 
plaintiff’s claim must be “plausible on its face” in light of the 
judge’s “judicial experience and common sense.” 
 
Courts should construe a complaint as a whole, and should not 
take any one statement in isolation, but if a court deems an 
allegation to be “conclusory” under some undefined standard, then 
the allegation may be ignored. 
 
Such Tao-like paradoxes are not easily applied by judges and 
lawyers. 
                                                          
 196. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (limiting the holding to the present circumstances of 
the case, and cautioning that equal protection in election processes presents many 
complexities). 
 197. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING No. 14 (Stephen Mitchell, trans., Harper & Row 
Publishers 1988) (“Look, and it can’t be seen.  Listen, and it can’t be heard.  Reach, 
and it can’t be grasped.  Above, it isn’t bright.  Below, it isn’t dark.”); id. at No. 2 
(“When people see some things as beautiful, other things become ugly.  When 
people see some things as good, other things become bad.”). 
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II. STUDY DESIGN 
I now reach the question:  does any of this academic discussion 
matter?  What is happening empirically to 1 2(b)(6) motions in the 
federal district courts since Twombly and Iqbal were decided? 
A. Scope of Cases Studied 
First, I chose to study only federal district court opinions.198  
Although they are bound to follow precedent in their own circuit 
court of appeals, district court judges are on the front line of 
applying the standards on 12(b)(6) motions.  District court opinions 
also offer the closest look at the arguments lawyers use on 12(b)(6) 
motions in daily practice. 
Second, for the greatest equivalence in the populations of cases 
decided under Conley and Twombly, I chose to limit my study of 
opinions decided under the Conley “no set of facts” standard to the 
two years immediately preceding Twombly.  As of the date this Article 
was written, Twombly had been in effect approximately two years.  
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard was issued in 1957 and was not 
abrogated until Twombly—a life span of fifty years. 
The difficulty of generating a truly random sample using Boolean 
searches on a legal database is apparent.  After some 
experimentation,199 I designed search terms in Westlaw to find as 
many cases as possible in the district courts decided on 12(b)(6) 
motions in the two years before and after Twombly.200  At the time I 
                                                          
 198. I used opinions both “published,” in the sense of opinions bound in the West 
Reporters, and “unpublished,” in the sense of opinions only available electronically 
on Westlaw.  Some scholars have suggested that the term “published” means any 
opinion available electronically; every opinion in the Database is “published” under 
this definition.  Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law:  Unpublication in the District Courts,  
53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 985 (2008); see also David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey 
R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 693 
(2007) (defining a federal district court “opinion” as “any judicial disposition on 
Westlaw or Lexis,” and an “order” as “any disposition that is not”).  Many scholars 
have noted that the reliability of a database consisting only of publicly available 
opinions on Westlaw and Lexis cannot be easily tested.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, 
Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem 
or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 591, 604 (2004) (“[T]he picture of a legal 
landscape that emerges from published opinions, at whatever court level, is very 
probably distorted.”); Levin, supra, at 988–94.  This is especially true at the district 
court level, where one estimate is that only 3% of all district court orders are 
available on Westlaw and Lexis.  Hoffman, Izenman & Lidicker, supra, at 710.  Still, 
unless and until the PACER electronic filing system for the federal courts becomes 
text-searchable, researching all existing district court orders is almost prohibitively 
resource-intensive.  See, e.g., Levin, supra, at 987. 
 199. Earlier iterations of the search terms cast too wide a net. 
 200. For cases decided under Conley’s “no set of facts” standard in the two years 
before Twombly, I searched the Westlaw DCT database using the following terms:  
(‘12(b)(6)’ ‘12(c)’ & (‘conley’ /2 ‘gibson’) & ‘no set of facts’ & da(after 5/21/2005) 
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performed these searches, they yielded 6010 cases under Conley and 
6319 cases under Twombly.  Using an online random number 
generator,201 I randomly selected 500 cases from the 6010 cases 
located in the two years before Twombly, and 500 cases from the 6319 
cases located after Twombly for potential inclusion in the Database. 
The decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal then intruded on May 18, 2009.   
To locate as many district court cases as possible deciding a 12(b)(6) 
motion under Iqbal, I again searched terms on Westlaw, limiting the 
search to cases from May 19, 2009, to August 31, 2009.202  This search 
generated 914 cases and I selected 200 of these cases using a random 
number generator.  Because the Iqbal cases span only three months 
and are fewer in number than the Conley or Twombly cases, caution 
should be used in drawing inferences from the Iqbal data. 
1. Cases excluded from the Database 
Of the 1200 cases thus selected as randomly as possible, only 1039 
were included in the Database (444 under Conley, 422 under Twombly, 
and 173 under Iqbal).  This was because the Westlaw searches, while 
fairly narrow, still returned cases that I excluded from the Database 
for various reasons: 
 
(a) I excluded sua sponte reviews of prisoners’ complaints 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)203 and 
of complaints submitted with an application to proceed  
in forma pauperis.204  District courts must review these 
complaints’ allegations and dismiss where the complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Although the courts purport to use the 12(b)(6) 
standards—whether under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal—in 
screening these cases to determine whether the complaint 
                                                          
& da(before 5/22/2007)).  For cases decided under Twombly’s “plausibility” standard 
in the two years after Twombly, I searched the same database using the following 
terms:  (‘12(b)(6)’ ‘12(c)’ & (‘twombly’ /p ‘plausib!’) & da(after 5/21/2007) & 
da(before 5/22/2009)).  Admittedly, I arbitrarily chose to use Westlaw rather than 
Lexis, but one empirical study suggests that Westlaw includes more district court 
opinions than Lexis.  See Hoffman, Izenman & Lidicker, supra note 198, at 710. 
 201. Research Randomizer, http://www.randomizer.org. 
 202. For cases decided under Iqbal, on August 31, 2009, I searched the Westlaw 
DCT database using the following terms:  (“Ashcroft” /2 “Iqbal” & “12(b)(6)” & 
da(after 5/18/2009)). 
 203. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2006) 
(describing conditions under which the court may review and dismiss a prisoner’s 
suit brought under a § 1983 claim). 
 204. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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states a claim for relief,205 there appeared to be some 
inconsistency in application, probably caused by the fact 
that many pro se inmates are also proceeding in forma 
pauperis.206  More importantly, these cases were decided 
without adversarial input from the defendant—thereby 
possibly resulting in more cases passing muster than 
might otherwise have occurred.  In addition, the converse 
possibility of bias against such litigants by the district 
courts counseled against the inclusion of these cases. 
 
(b) I excluded cases that the court decided on other grounds 
without considering an actual 12(b)(6) motion, even 
though the 12(b)(6) standard might have been 
mentioned or a 12(b)(6) motion might have been filed 
(thus yielding its location by the Westlaw search).207  These 
excluded cases fall into two subcategories: 
 
(i) Cases decided on other types of motions to 
dismiss, such as motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, 
improper venue, or failure to join an 
indispensable party. 
(ii) Cases decided on a type of motion other than a 
motion to dismiss.  For example, defendants 
frequently move “to dismiss, or in the alternative, 
for summary judgment” under FRCP Rule 56.  
Summary judgment motions are decided under a 
different standard than 12(b)(6) motions.208  
                                                          
 205. E.g., Cutchin v. Hogshire, No. 3:08CV802, 2009 WL 2899809, at *4 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 9, 2009). 
 206. For example, some courts state that they need not accept as true certain 
factual allegations in an in forma pauperis complaint.  E.g., Salcedo v. Rossotti,  
636 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the court can “dismiss those claims 
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless or describe fantastic or delusional 
scenarios” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 
319, 327 (1989)). 
 207. The changing standard for dismissal on 12(b)(6) motions, however, may spill 
over into motions decided under these other grounds.  Courts deciding motions to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), for example, 
frequently cite the 12(b)(6) standard as applicable, although the courts use varying 
formulations.  E.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e note that the standard is the same when considering a facial attack under 
12(b)(1) or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 208. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”). 
  
2010] DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY? 587 
Accordingly, I excluded any case that was expressly 
or impliedly decided under Rule 56.  Another 
common example of this type of excluded case is 
on a claimant’s motion to amend a pleading, 
where the opponent of the motion argues that the 
amendment would be futile.  Although, like the 
PLRA screening cases, the court in theory applies 
the 12(b)(6) standard to such motions to amend,  
I chose to exclude these cases on the ground that 
the strategic difference in the procedural posture 
of a motion to amend could potentially affect the 
ruling independently of the governing 12(b)(6) 
standard. 
 
(c) I excluded cases decided under an explicit “heightened 
pleading” standard, which is supposedly “heightened” in 
relation to the (theoretically) “lower” default pleading 
standard under Rule 8(a)(2).  Thus, I excluded cases 
alleging fraud, which must be pled with particularity,209 
cases brought under the PSLRA,210 which has additional 
heightened pleading requirements,211 and derivative cases 
filed under Rule 23.1.212 
                                                          
 209. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).  In addition, claims 
other than common law fraud that allege some sort of underlying deception, such as 
securities fraud, RICO, and qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, must also be 
pled with particularity.  Such cases are not governed by Twombly and Iqbal, which 
purport only to interpret Rule 8(a)(2). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006). 
 211. E.g., § 78u-4(b)(1) (stating that, in private actions in which the plaintiff 
alleges that the defendant made misleading statements or omissions, “the complaint 
shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons 
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed”); § 78u-4(b)(2) (stating that in 
private actions for damages in which plaintiff must prove “that the defendant acted 
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or 
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”). 
 212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b) (In derivative actions, “[t]he complaint must be 
verified and must . . . (3) state with particularity:  (A) any effort by the plaintiff to 
obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and,  
if necessary, from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not 
obtaining the action or not making the effort.”). 
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2. Cases included in the Database 
 Cases that I did include in the Database (other than those involving 
the archetypical 12(b)(6) motion by a defendant to dismiss a 
complaint) were: 
 
(a) 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss any opposing party’s pleading 
(such as a plaintiff’s motion to dismiss a counterclaim,  
or a third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss a third-
party complaint). 
(b) 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, which are 
decided under the same standard as, and are functionally 
equivalent to, 12(b)(6) motions.213 
(c) Cases that included motions other than 12(b)(6), but 
which also included a count or claim that was decided on 
a separable 12(b)(6) issue.  In such cases I omitted the 
non-12(b)(6) count or claim from the coding of the cases 
and included only the 12(b)(6) count or claim.214 
 
I thought that I might need to treat cases that were removed to 
federal court differently than those originating in federal court.  
What if the state court’s pleading standards were looser than the 
federal court’s standards?  Apparently, nobody thinks this is a 
problem yet—I did not find a discussion of it in any removed case.  
Because federal pleading is (probably) still known as “notice 
pleading,” ostensibly the most liberal pleading standard, perhaps it is 
assumed that no state’s pleading regime could be any more liberal.  
After Twombly and Iqbal are thoroughly digested, this issue may 
emerge if states reject the “plausibility” approach.215 
                                                          
 213. E.g., Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 
2009); Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 214. For example, one defendant might move to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction; I would not include the ruling on this defendant’s motion in the 
Database.  If the personal jurisdiction motion was denied, and that same defendant 
also moved simultaneously to dismiss under 12(b)(6), I would include the 12(b)(6) 
ruling in the Database.  To take this example further, if that same defendant’s 
personal jurisdiction motion was granted, but a second defendant moved to dismiss 
under 12(b)(6), I included in the Database only the ruling on the second 
defendant’s motion. 
 215. Cf. Carol L. Zeiner, When Kelo Met Twombly-Iqbal:  Implications for Pretext 
Challenges to Eminent Domain, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Z.W. Julius 
Chen, Note, Following the Leader:  Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural 
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2009) (analyzing potential problems that may 
arise in a system where the state courts use Conley pleading standards and the federal 
courts use a Twombly standard). 
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B. Coding the Cases 
I coded the following information (variables) for each opinion 
included in the Database. 
1. Identifying information 
 
(a) Identifying number:  assigned number generated by the 
random number generator. 
(b) Name and citation:  names of parties and citation of the 
case. 
2. Independent variables216 
 
(a) Circuit:  judicial circuit within which the district court lies 
(for example, if the opinion was written by a judge in the 
Southern District of New York, I coded the case as coming 
from within the Second Circuit). 
(b) Date:  date of the opinion. 
(c) Type of judge:  whether the opinion was written by a district 
court judge or a magistrate judge.  I coded as “district 
court judge” cases which were decided by a district court 
judge, cases in which a district court judge explicitly 
incorporated a magistrate judge’s recommendation,217 and 
cases in which a magistrate judge stated explicitly that the 
parties had consented to the magistrate’s final ruling.   
I coded as “magistrate judge” cases in which a magistrate 
was making only a “recommendation” to the district court 
judge and cases in which the magistrate judge’s status was 
unclear. 
(d) Pro se status:  whether the party whose pleading was being 
challenged on a 12(b)(6) motion (most frequently, the 
plaintiff) was represented by counsel or was proceeding 
pro se.  When unclear, I left this field blank. 
                                                          
 216. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801, 808 
(2007) (“For purposes of designing their research projects, scholars tend to 
differentiate between dependent variables—the outcomes or responses the researcher 
is trying to explain—and independent variables—the factors that may help account for 
or explain the outcome.” (emphasis added)). 
 217. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006) (describing the “jurisdiction, powers, and 
temporary assignment” of magistrate judges). 
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(e) Class action:  whether the case was brought as a putative 
class action (whether or not the class was actually 
certified). 
(f) Nature of suit:  Statistical difficulties may ensue when a 
variable has so many subcategories that only a handful of 
observations fall under each.218  Further, experts in 
empirical legal research warn of generating so much 
detailed information that the main points are obscured.219  
Therefore, I tried to keep the number of values for this 
variable to a minimum while simultaneously focusing on 
the types of cases postulated to be most threatened by 
Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
I began with the major categories listed on the federal district court 
Civil Cover Sheet220:  “Contract,” “Real Property,” “Torts,” “Civil 
Rights,” “Prisoner Petitions,” “Forfeiture/Penalty,” “Labor,” 
“Immigration,” “Bankruptcy,” “Property Rights” (meaning 
intellectual property rights),221 “Social Security,” “Federal Tax Suits,” 
and “Other Statutes.”  It should be noted that I did not review the 
Civil Cover Sheets actually filed in the cases in the Database to see 
what box the plaintiff checked; I determined the nature of the suit 
myself by reviewing each opinion. 
For various reasons, it quickly became apparent that few to no cases 
involving “Real Property,” “Forfeiture/Penalty,” “Immigration,” 
“Bankruptcy,” “Social Security,” and “Federal Tax” engender 
opinions on 12(b)(6) motions.222  Another way of putting this is that 
                                                          
 218. See, e.g., MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 201 
(2d ed. 2001) (“For tables larger than 2 X 2, it is recommended that chi-squared not 
be used if the expected cell frequency is less than 5 in more than 20% of the cells or 
less than 1 in more than 10% of the cells.”). 
 219. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1861 
(2006) (arguing that graphical analysis should not be judged by how detailed it is, 
but rather how quickly a reader can understand it). 
 220. See Civil Cover Sheet, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044.pdf. 
 221. The boxes in this category include only “Copyright,” “Patent,” and 
“Trademark.”  See id. 
 222. Cases involving core “Real Property” (as opposed to a dispute over a lease, 
which I coded as a “Contract”) constitute only a small fraction of cases filed in 
federal district courts.  See, e.g., JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:  
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 162–64 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/c2.pdf [hereinafter 2006 REPORT] 
(presenting data demonstrating that real property actions comprised less than 2% of 
all cases filed in U.S. district courts for the year ending September 30, 2006).  There 
were only two “Real Property” cases in the Database.  I recoded these two cases as 
“Contract.” 
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Twombly and Iqbal have no practical effect on approximately 11% of 
all cases in federal district court. 
As for prisoner petitions, the vast majority of these cases in the 
Database alleged civil rights violations.  Accordingly, I coded them as 
“Civil Rights.” 
 
This left the following six major categories: 
 
(i) Contracts:  All types of contractual disputes, 
including insurance contracts and leases. 
 
(ii) Torts:  All types of common law tort claims (e.g., 
negligence, wrongful death, products liability, 
tortious interference with contract, defamation, 
conversion, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, breach of fiduciary duty), and claims 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act223 and Alien 
Tort Claims Act.224 
 
(iii) Civil rights:  These cases were also coded in four 
subcategories: 
 
[1] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged federal 
constitutional violations, whether or not 
they purported to bring the case under  
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the 
law), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for 
deprivation of rights), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
                                                          
“Forfeiture” and “Penalty” cases are brought overwhelmingly by the United States 
and apparently 12(b)(6) motions are virtually unknown in such cases.  See id.   
None of the 1200 cases reviewed for the Database involved “Forfeiture” or “Penalty.” 
The bulk of “Immigration” and “Bankruptcy” cases proceed in specialized courts; 
in those narrow instances where the district court has jurisdiction, 12(b)(6) motions 
appear to be uncommon.  Only four “Immigration” cases and one “Bankruptcy” case 
appeared in the Database; I recoded the five cases as “Other Statutes.” 
“Social Security” cases comprise about 6% of all cases filed—for example, a 
sizeable 14,404 cases in 2006—the vast majority against the United States.  Id.  Again, 
none of the 1200 cases reviewed for the Database involved “Social Security,” 
suggesting that “Social Security” cases are not normally amenable to 12(b)(6) 
motions. 
Finally, “Tax Suits” make up a tiny 0.6% of all cases filed, see id., and accordingly 
generated only twelve of the cases in the Database.  I recoded these twelve cases as 
“Other Statutes.” 
 223. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2006). 
 224. Id. § 1350. 
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(conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), 
or Bivens actions. 
[2] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged 
unlawful employment discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national 
origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.225 
[3] Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”),226 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),227 
or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.228 
[4] Any other civil rights actions, including sex 
discrimination under Title IX.229 
 
(iv) Labor:  These cases were coded in two 
subcategories: 
 
[1] Cases brought under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”)230 or any other provision of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).231 
[2] Other labor cases, including those brought 
under the Labor-Management Relations 
Act (“LMRA”)232 or the Railway Labor 
Act.233 
 
(v) Intellectual property:  These include cases in which 
the plaintiffs alleged copyright, patent, or 
trademark infringement as well as in which the 
plaintiffs alleged misappropriation of trade secrets. 
 
(vi) All other federal and state statutes:  These cases were 
also coded in four subcategories: 
                                                          
 225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006). 
 226. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006). 
 228. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 229. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 230. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (c) (2006). 
 231. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (establishing penalties for failure to pay 
minimum wage or overtime). 
 232. Id. § 185. 
 233. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2006). 
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[1] Antitrust claims under the Sherman Act,234 
the Clayton Act,235 or state antitrust 
statutes.236 
[2] Consumer credit claims, including cases 
brought under the Truth-in-Lending Act 
(“TILA”),237 the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”),238 the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”),239 or the Real 
Estate Settlement Practices Act 
(“RESPA”).240 
[3] Claims under the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”).241 
[4] All other federal or state statutory claims.242 
 
Once I chose these categories, the next issue became how to place 
each case in a single category.243  The paradigmatic “one plaintiff, one 
defendant, one claim” case that inhabits law school hypotheticals and 
edited opinions in casebooks is not actually the mode in federal 
district court, at least in cases that result in 12(b)(6) motions.  Most 
cases contain numerous legal theories that are usually alleged in 
separate counts and that are frequently asserted against a multitude 
                                                          
 234. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 235. Id. § 15. 
 236. E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 (West 2008) (describing activities that 
create a trust). 
 237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006). 
 238. Id. §§ 1692–1692p. 
 239. Id. §§ 1681–1681x. 
 240. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17 (2006). 
 241. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006). 
 242. This category includes claims brought under environmental statutes, 
franchise statutes, provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and a host of other 
statutes not included within any of the other categories. 
 243. I considered coding the ruling on each count and/or each defendant 
separately, and I test-coded about fifty cases this way.  I abandoned this effort for two 
main reasons.  First, it was frequently impossible to discern the information I needed 
from the opinions without looking at the actual pleadings filed.  This is particularly 
true in § 1983 cases, in which plaintiffs tend to lump several defendants and several 
legal theories into a single count.  The detailed chart of counts, defendants, and 
claims prepared by Magistrate Judge Komives in Hann v. Michigan, No. 05-CV-71347-
DT, 2007 WL 1322328, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2007), was the exception, not the 
rule, and that case was by no means atypical of the complexity of such cases.  Second, 
coding the ruling on each count and/or defendant as a separate data entry would 
give cases with multiple counts more weight—in some cases at least ten times more 
weight—than a single-count case.       
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of defendants.  To assign only one “nature of suit” to each opinion,  
I devised guidelines that I applied consistently. 
First, even if a plaintiff asserted more than one count in a 
complaint, I only coded the count or counts that were challenged by 
a 12(b)(6) motion and were governed by the normal pleading 
standard of Rule 8(a)(2). 
For example, assume that a complaint asserted three counts—for 
breach of contract, fraud, and libel.  Assume also that the defendant 
filed a 12(b)(6) motion attacking only the fraud and libel counts, but 
that the fraud motion was governed by the heightened pleading 
standard of Rule 9(b).  The contract claim was not challenged and 
the fraud claim was not governed by the standard I am studying.  
Therefore, I would code this case in the Database as a “Tort” (libel) 
and then code only the court’s ruling on the libel claim. 
A further application of the rule described above occurred when 
another motion was made in addition to, or in the alternative to, a 
12(b)(6) motion, such as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment.  For example, in a 
case with two defendants, assume that “Defendant A” had moved to 
dismiss a single count of negligence for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and for failure to state a claim for relief.  Assume also that 
“Defendant B” had moved to dismiss two counts (e.g., a civil rights 
claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim) for 
failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.  
Say that the court had granted Defendant A’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, thereby mooting Defendant A’s 
12(b)(6) motion.  Say also that the court had stated that it had 
decided the civil rights count of Defendant B’s motion under the 
summary judgment standard, but that it had decided the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress count of Defendant B’s motion under 
the 12(b)(6) standard.  I would have coded this case as a “Tort” and 
then coded only the court’s ruling on the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. 
Second, applying the rule described above, if more than one count 
in the opinion was challenged by a 12(b)(6) motion governed by 
8(a)(2), I usually would have coded the “nature of suit” for this type 
of case by the first such count appearing in the opinion.  For 
example, if a defendant had filed a 12(b)(6) motion against Count I 
(for breach of contract) and Count II (for tortious interference with 
contract), I would have coded this as a “Contract” case.  On occasion, 
though, I determined that one of the counts was more important and 
more indicative of the case as a whole and coded the “nature of suit” 
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by that count.  For example, say that the defendant had moved to 
dismiss Count I (for breach of fiduciary duty), Count II (for TILA 
violations), and Count III (for FCRA violations).  I would have coded 
this case as “Consumer Credit” (within “Other Statutes”), as better 
capturing the essence of the suit than “Tort.” 
Third, I used only the parties’ and court’s designation of the legal 
theories for relief, rather than supplying what I might have 
considered the “better” claim.  For example, in a pro se case filed by a 
man asserting a civil rights claim against his eye doctor and 
manufacturer Bausch & Lomb (claiming that his contact lens 
solution caused him to go blind),244 it seemed to me that a products 
liability claim was a better fit (and somewhat less ludicrous) than a  
§ 1983 claim.  But § 1983 was the claim that he had asserted and was 
the claim that the judge ruled on, so I coded the case as  
“Civil Rights.” 
Fourth, claims for indemnification or contribution were classified 
according to the nature of the underlying suit (usually, “Contract” or 
“Tort”). 
 
(g) Authority:  I coded the case as “Conley” if the court cited 
Conley and used the Conley “no set of facts” standard as at 
least one of the governing principles in the motion.245   
I coded the case “Twombly” if the court cited Twombly and 
used some formulation of the Twombly “plausibility” 
standard as at least one of the governing principles in the 
motion.246  I coded the case “Iqbal” if the court cited Iqbal 
as at least one of the governing authorities in deciding the 
12(b)(6) motion.247 
                                                          
 244. Spears v. Bausch & Lomb, No. C2-06-470, 2007 WL 764305, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 9, 2007). 
 245. Because of the structure of the Westlaw search, I assumed that these criteria 
would be met for every case found by the search in the two years before Twombly.  
However, there was one case in which the court only cited Conley when repeating the 
plaintiff’s arguments and did not clarify that the court itself was applying “no set of 
facts.”  I did not include this case in the Database. 
 246. Only one court in the cases I reviewed cited Twombly but refused to apply it to 
a non-antitrust case.  I did not include this case in the Database.  Note that in 
addition to citing Twombly, most district courts continue to cite Conley for the  
“fair notice” quote when deciding 12(b)(6) motions. 
 247. In addition to citing Iqbal, most district courts in deciding 12(b)(6) motions 
continue to cite Twombly for the “plausibility” standard and many district courts 
continue to cite Conley for the “fair notice” quote. 
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3. Dependent variables248 
 
(a) Ruling:  As should be evident from the foregoing 
examples, I coded only the court’s ruling on counts that 
were challenged by a 12(b)(6) (or 12(c)) motion under 
the 8(a)(2) standard.  As to those counts, I used the 
following categories for the rulings on the motions: 
 
(1) Grant without leave to amend the pleading. 
(2) Grant with leave to amend the pleading. 
(3) Mixed ruling when the court granted the motion 
(with or without leave to amend) on one or more 




For some of the analyses, I later collapsed the two “grant” 
subcategories into one:  grant with or without leave to amend. 
 
(b) Pending case status:  I attempted to gauge how frequently a 
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion was fatal to the entire case.   
I coded this variable as “no” if any part of the case 
remained pending after the court’s ruling, and as “yes” if 
the grant of the 12(b)(6) motion (perhaps in conjunction 
with other rulings such as the grant of a summary 
judgment motion) resulted in the dismissal of the entire 
case. 
III. RESULTS 
I present the results of this study in two parts.  Part III(A) contains 
some descriptive statistics of the Database, presented in two-way tables 
or graphs; for example, this Part presents the frequency of each 
ruling outcome under each authority, as in Table 1.  Part III(B) 
presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression in which the 
ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion is the dependent variable, and the 
results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is 
whether the case was entirely dismissed. 
It is important to note that inferences—if any—to be drawn from 
the statistics should be confined to the regressions.  I believe that the 
                                                          
 248. See Epstein, Martin & Boyd, supra note 216, at 808 (summarizing the 
difference between dependent and independent variables). 
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raw frequencies in Part III(A) may be of interest to the reader.  
However, multiple factors may affect the ruling on the 12(b)(6) 
motion, and two-way tables cannot account for any confounding 
effects of other variables.249  As presented in two-way tables, any 
apparent relationships between the independent variables and 
outcomes can be misleading. 
A. Two-Way Tables and Graphs 
1. Differences in overall rulings on 12(b)(6) motions 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the frequency of rulings on 12(b)(6) 
motions in the Database under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal.  Both 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show all four ruling categories:  “grant without 
leave to amend,” “grant with leave to amend,” “mixed,” and “deny.” 
 
Figure 1 
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions  



















                                                          
 249. A confounding variable is one that is associated with both the dependent 
variable and another independent variable.  For example, say the dependent variable 
is the presence or absence of heart disease, and that men suffer heart disease at an 
increasingly higher rate than women as they age.  The variable “age” is associated 
with both the dependent variable, heart disease, as well as the independent variable, 
“gender.”  See DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions  
Under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal 
 
(1039 cases between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009) 
Frequency in the Database (expected frequency) 






























































Pearson chi2(6) = 26.256, Pr = 0.000 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show that under any authority, 12(b)(6) 
motions are more frequently successful than one might suppose.250  
Clearly, the endlessly repeated old saw that “12(b)(6) motions are 
viewed with disfavor and rarely granted”251 should be laid to rest.   
                                                          
 250. The surprisingly large percentage of 12(b)(6) motions that are granted, 
whether under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal, has profound implications for the perceived 
desirability of further “tort reform” or “lawsuit reform.”  See, e.g., Patricia W. 
Hatamyar, The Effect of “Tort Reform” on Tort Case Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 560–62 
(2009) (arguing that tort reform creates barriers and reduces plaintiffs’ ability to 
recover, thus causing a decrease in tort filings).  At least in federal court, the 
12(b)(6) motion appears to be a potent means for terminating a lawsuit in its early 
stages. 
 251. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
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Of all 12(b)(6) motions in the Database, 39% were granted without 
leave to amend and another 9% were granted with leave to amend.252  
Even before Twombly, these courts were already granting (with and 
without leave to amend) almost half (46%) of all 12(b)(6) motions. 
Looking at differences in rulings under different authorities, Table 
1 and Figure 1 show that there was a slight decline in the proportion 
of motions granted without leave to amend from the Database under 
Conley (40%) to Twombly (39%) to Iqbal (37%).  However, the 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions in the Database that were granted 
with leave to amend increased from 6% under Conley to 9% under 
Twombly to 19% under Iqbal.  The proportion of “mixed” rulings also 
increased slightly under Twombly to 30% as compared to 28% under 
Conley, but then declined to 25% under Iqbal.  The proportion of 
motions denied—i.e., plaintiff wins—fell from 26% under Conley to 
23% under Twombly to only 18% under Iqbal. 
Keeping in mind my earlier point about the potentially 
confounding effects of other variables, the results of a chi-squared 
distribution test253 indicate that the different proportions in rulings 
between cases decided under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal are 
“statistically significant.”254  The probability that this distribution 
occurred by chance is less than 0.1%.  A “significant” chi square in a 
contingency table such as Table 1 indicates that the variables forming 
the table are related, but the chi square alone does not explain the 
relationship.  For more meaningful information, an analysis of each 
cell’s contribution to chi square is performed.  In Table 1, the largest 
contributors to the chi square are grants with leave to amend under 
Conley255 and grants with leave to amend under Iqbal.256 
                                                          
 252. Note, however, that the data also show that even if a 12(b)(6) motion is 
granted without leave to amend, the entire case is not necessarily dismissed at that 
time; part of the case often remains pending.  See infra notes 277–279 and 
accompanying text. 
 253. The chi-squared distribution is used to compare expected to actual values in 
categorical data to test for statistical differences.  Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian 
Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 792 n.268 
(1995). 
 254. Epstein, Martin & Schneider, supra note 219, at 1813 n.3 (defining 
“statistically significant” to mean a relationship whose “existence cannot be explained 
by chance alone”).  As the minimally acceptable level of so-called “statistical 
significance,” researchers commonly require a maximum probability of 10%—and 
preferably no higher than 5%—that the result could have occurred by chance.   
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS 18 (2005) (“Levels of significance 
below 10 percent are rarely accepted.”). 
 255. The contribution is 4.599 of the chi square of 26.256.  The adjusted residual 
(residuals standardized to a normal distribution) is -2.978.  An adjusted residual with 
an absolute value of 2.58 or greater is significant at the 1% level.  KEVIN DURRHEIM & 
COLIN TREDOUX, NUMBERS, HYPOTHESES & CONCLUSIONS:  A COURSE IN STATISTICS FOR 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 374–75 (2004). 
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Any explanation I could postulate for why grants with leave to 
amend are significantly less than expected under Conley and 
significantly more than expected under Iqbal is entirely speculative.  
Perhaps district courts were comfortable enough with the Conley 
standard to confidently discern when a dismissal without leave to 
amend would not be reversed on appeal, while the newness of the 
Iqbal standard caused them to err on the side of allowing the plaintiff 
one more chance to plead. 
If the distribution of rulings includes only those cases decided 
under Conley and Twombly (without including the cases under Iqbal), 
there is an unacceptably high probability (35.9%) that the 
differences could have occurred by chance.257  In other words, the 
differences in rulings between Conley and Twombly are not alone large 
enough to reject the null hypothesis that Twombly alone had no effect 
on courts’ rulings on 12(b)(6) motions—at least as measured by a 
Pearson chi squared distribution. 
As Table 1 shows, however, the inclusion of cases decided under 
Iqbal increases the differences in proportions of rulings.  At this early 
point, Iqbal appears to have had a measurable impact on rulings.  
Another way of looking at this is to examine the 95% confidence 
intervals.  The percentage of motions granted with leave to amend 
under Iqbal (19%) is well above the high end of the 95% confidence 
interval for cases decided under Conley (9%) and Twombly (11%).  
The percentage of motions denied under Iqbal (18%) is below the 
95% confidence interval for cases decided under Conley (22%) and 
Twombly (19%). 
Whether the noticeable increase in dismissals with leave to amend 
under Twombly and Iqbal will eventually translate into dismissals with 
prejudice remains to be seen.  I am not aware of any empirical study 
that examines how frequently complaints are amended after a 
12(b)(6) motion is granted with leave to amend; given the high 
percentage of pro se plaintiffs in the Database, one could speculate 
that many do not even try to amend.  Nor am I aware of any study 
that examines how frequently a renewed 12(b)(6) motion directed to 
an amended complaint is granted without leave to amend; many 
plaintiffs may lack the legal competence or factual knowledge 
(without discovery) to amend their complaints satisfactorily.  In such 
cases, a grant of a 12(b)(6) motion, even with leave to amend, will be 
                                                          
 256. The contribution is 17.055, over half of the chi square of 26.256.   
The adjusted residual (residuals standardized to a normal distribution) is 4.753. 
 257. Pearson chi2(3) = 3.2166, Pr = 0.359. 
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just the preliminary step in the dismissal of a complaint (or part 
thereof) with prejudice. 
In Table 2 and Figure 2 below, the ruling categories “grant without 
leave to amend” and “grant with leave to amend” are combined into 
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Figure 2 



















With the “grant” categories combined, the increase in the grant of 
12(b)(6) motions from Conley (46%) to Twombly (48%) to Iqbal 
(56%) is more obvious.  In the overall time period, 49% of 12(b)(6) 
motions in the Database were granted. 
However, the probability of the distribution in Table 2 and Figure 
2, using only three subcategories for rulings (“grant,” “mixed,” and 
“deny”), occurring by chance is 15.2% using a Pearson chi-squared 
distribution test—too high for conventional statistical significance.   
A multinomial logistic regression (discussed below)258 better isolates 
the predictive effect of the authority on the ruling. 
2. Differences in rulings by nature of suit 
One of the important concerns about Twombly and Iqbal is their 
potentially negative effect on access to justice.259  Thus, pleadings 
requirements applied to cases typically brought by individuals 
(frequently on a contingent-fee basis)—such as civil rights, consumer 
credit, or personal injury cases—would be of particular interest. 
                                                          
 258. See infra Table 4. 
 259. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket:  Plaintiffs’ Lawyers 
Seek to Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 31 (discussing 
civil rights advocates’ perspective that plaintiffs do not have access to the facts 













0 20 40 60 
Percentage of rulings
  
2010] DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY? 603 
Let us first examine the frequency of different types of suits in the 
Database.  Figure 3 shows the percentage of cases selected by nature 
of suit (using six simplified subcategories)260 and governing authority.  
Figure 4 shows similar information, using the more detailed 
subcategories for nature of suit.261  Appendix Table A contains the 
backup for Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3 





















                                                          
 260. See supra notes 221–241 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 221–241 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 4 























Each bar in Figures 3 and 4 represents the percentage of cases in 
the Database involving a specific type of suit, decided under a 
particular authority.  For example, of all cases in the Database 
decided under Conley, 13% were “Contract” cases, 16% were “Tort” 
cases, 43% were “Civil Rights” cases, 6% were “Labor” cases, 3% were 
“Intellectual Property” cases, and 20% involved “Other Statutes” 
(using the six simplified categories of Figure 3). 
Clearly, 12(b)(6) motions in the Database were filed in civil rights 
cases far more frequently than in any other type of case.  Civil rights 
cases overall comprised 44% of the Database, and this percentage 
does not vary much among Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal.  In particular, 
constitutional civil rights cases (a subcategory of all civil rights cases) 
accounted for 32% of all cases in the Database.  Thus, constitutional 
civil rights cases made up 74% (141/190) of all civil rights cases in 
the Database under Conley, 73% (135/186) of all civil rights cases in 
the Database under Twombly, and 71% (55/78) of all civil rights cases 
in the Database under Iqbal.  Falling well behind civil rights cases, the 
next largest group of cases in the Database involved “Other Statutes” 
Percentage of cases
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(including “Consumer Credit,” “Antitrust,” and “RICO”)—20% 
under Conley, 21% under Twombly, and 23% under Iqbal. 
The Database also permits an examination of the rulings on 
12(b)(6) motions made in different types of lawsuits.  Figure 5 
presents the percentage of rulings by nature of suit for the whole 
Database (cases decided under all three authorities).  The exact 
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Granted, no amend 
Reference line at 49% shows overall average.
Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table B. 
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Each bar in Figure 5 represents the percentage of 12(b)(6) 
motions in the Database receiving that type of ruling in that type of 
suit.  For example, of all “Contract” cases in the Database, 33% of 
12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave to amend), 
35% received a mixed ruling, and 32% were denied. 
Comparing the percentage of rulings in different types of cases in 
Figure 5 (detailed in Appendix Table B) with the total percentage of 
rulings in all cases listed in Table 2, we can see which types of cases 
have a higher-than-average or lower-than-average percentage of a 
certain ruling.  For example, approximately 49% of all 12(b)(6) 
motions in the Database were granted (with or without leave to 
amend).262  In cases involving “Contracts” (33%), “Torts” (44%), 
“ERISA” (39%), “Intellectual Property” (33%), and “RICO” (39%), 
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted was lower than average.  
In contrast, the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted (with or 
without leave to amend) was above average in cases involving 
“Constitutional Civil Rights” (53%), the “ADA and ADEA” (53%), 
“LMRA and Other Labor” (60%), “Consumer Credit” (59%), and 
“Other Statutes” (57%). 
Figure 6 presents the percentage of cases in the Database in which 
the 12(b)(6) motion was granted (with and without leave to amend) 
by the six simplified categories for nature of suit, with the 
percentages under Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal shown separately.  The 
exact frequencies underlying Figure 6 (as well as the frequency of 





                                                          
 262. See supra Table 2. 
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Figure 6 
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions Granted 























Figure 6 indicates that for the most part, the percentage of motions 
granted (with or without leave to amend) by nature of suit (for cases 
in the Database) did not appreciably change before Iqbal was 
decided.  For example, about 32% of 12(b)(6) motions in “Contract” 
cases decided under Conley were granted; in “Contract” cases decided 
under Twombly, 35% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted. 
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, however, we can discern an upward 
trend in granting 12(b)(6) motions in some types of cases.  The 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in “Tort” cases increased 
from Conley (40%) to Twombly (46%) to Iqbal (52%).  The percentage 
of 12(b)(6) motions granted in “Civil Rights Cases” grew from 50% 
under Conley to 53% under Twombly to 58% under Iqbal.  The 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in cases involving “Other 
Statutes” (including “Consumer Credit,” “Antitrust,” “RICO,” and 
“Environmental,” among others) declined from Conley (53%) to 
Twombly (50%), but then increased significantly to a whopping 72% 
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Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table C.
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“grants” under Twombly and Iqbal is comprised of grants with leave to 
amend. 
Figure 7 presents essentially the same information as Figure 6—the 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions in the Database granted (with or 
without leave to amend) by nature of suit and authority—but broken 
down into more detailed subcategories of nature of suit.  Appendix 
Table D presents the exact frequencies for Figure 7, as well as the 
frequency of 12(b)(6) motions denied and given mixed rulings. 
 
Figure 7 
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions Granted 
























Again, we can spot an increase in the granting of 12(b)(6) motions  
(with or without leave to amend) from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal for 
certain types of cases in the Database.  The percentage of 12(b)(6) 
motions granted (with or without leave to amend) in “Constitutional 
Civil Rights” cases grew from 50% under Conley to 55% under 
Twombly to 60% under Iqbal.  The rate of granted 12(b)(6) motions 
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under Conley to 54% under Twombly to 53% under Iqbal.  The rate of 
granted 12(b)(6) motions in “Consumer Credit” cases soared from 
47% under Conley and Twombly to 92% under Iqbal.  The rate of 
granted 12(b)(6) motions (with or without leave to amend) in cases 
involving “Other Statutes” (not including “Antitrust,” “Consumer 
Credit,” or “RICO”) grew from 54% under Conley to 56% under 
Twombly to 68% under Iqbal. 
In some categories, differences that appear large (such as a 
decrease in percentage of motions granted in “Other Civil Rights” 
cases—not including “Constitutional Civil Rights,” “Title VII,” “ADA 
or ADEA”—from 70% under Conley to 36% under Twombly to 0% 
under Iqbal) may be skewed as a result of the small number of cases in 
that category.  For “Other Civil Rights,” the Database contained 
twenty-two cases, only one of which was decided under Iqbal.  
Ironically, 12(b)(6) motions filed in “Antitrust” cases under Conley 
were more successful (100% of two cases) than under Twombly, an 
antitrust case (44% of nine cases), or Iqbal (33% of three cases).  
However, the small sample numbers here counsel against reading too 
much into the data. 
3. Differences in rulings by district courts in different circuit courts of 
appeals 
Strict “representativeness is not the primary goal of random 
sampling,”263 and as indicated above,264 the Database is not a perfectly 
random sample in any event.  Nonetheless, some readers may wonder 
whether the Database’s distribution of district court cases by circuit is 
similar to the actual distribution of cases pending by circuit.  Table 3 
compares these proportions in the Database to the proportions of 
actual district court cases, as reported by the Administrative Office of 
the Courts.265 
Table 3 indicates that this Database’s proportions of district court 
cases from the twelve circuits very roughly approximate the 
                                                          
 263. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 218, at 259. 
 264. See supra note 198. 
 265. 2006 REPORT, supra note 222, at 159–61 (providing a basis for actual cases 
pending in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in Table 3 using Table C-1:  U.S. District 
Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the 12-Month 
Period Ending September 30, 2006); JAMES C. DUFF, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR:  JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 140–42 (2009), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 REPORT] (providing the number of U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Commenced, Terminated and Pending for fiscal years 2007 and 2008).  The figures 
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009 were not available at the time of this 
writing. 
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proportions of actual district court cases pending by circuit.  It should 
be noted that the time period covered by the Database (May 22, 2005 
to August 31, 2009) does not precisely match the Administrative 
Office of the Courts’ annual reporting period, which ends on 
September 30.266  But the comparison of Database cases to actual 
cases pending by circuit may address in some small degree the 




Number and Percentage of District Court Cases in the Database by Circuit 
Compared to Percentages of Actual District Court Cases Pending by Circuit 
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 266. Fiscal years 2005 and 2006 roughly cover the time period of the cases in the 
Database decided under Conley; fiscal years 2007 and 2008 roughly cover the time 
period of the cases in the Database decided under Twombly.  No figures on actual 
cases pending after September 30, 2008, are available at this writing. 
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As Table 3 illustrates, district courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits 
may be somewhat underrepresented in the Database.  For example, 
from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2008, cases pending in 
district courts within the Fifth Circuit made up approximately 13.9% 
of all district court cases pending; cases chosen for inclusion in the 
Database here from district courts in the Fifth Circuit account for 
only 8.4% of the cases in the Database, which covers the period from 
May 22, 2005, to August 31, 2009. 
Conversely, district courts in the Second, Seventh, and D.C. 
Circuits may be somewhat overrepresented in the Database.   
For example, from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2008, cases 
pending in district courts within the Second Circuit comprised 
approximately 13% of all district court cases pending; cases chosen 
for inclusion in the Database here from district courts in the Second 
Circuit make up 17.1% of the cases in the Database, which covers the 
period from May 22, 2005, to August 31, 2009. 
The difference between the percentage of actual district court 
cases pending by circuit and the percentage of cases in the Database 
is greatest when looking only at the cases decided under Iqbal.  This is 
probably due to the short period of time (approximately three 
months) and the smaller number of cases in the Database covered by 
Iqbal. 
We turn now to possible differences in the rate of granting 
12(b)(6) motions depending on the circuit in which a district court 
sits.  Figure 8 shows the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted 
(with or without leave to amend) by district courts in the Database 
within each of the twelve circuit courts of appeals for the entire 
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Figure 8 
Percentage of 12(b)(6) Motions in the Database 




















Recall that about 49% of 12(b)(6) motions overall in the Database 
were granted (with or without leave to amend).267  Figure 8 (detailed 
in Appendix Table E) shows that district courts in the Second and 
D.C. Circuits granted the 12(b)(6) motions (with or without leave to 
amend) in the Database at a higher-than-average rate (60% granted 
by district court judges in the Second Circuit and 67% granted by 
district court judges in the D.C. Circuit).  District courts in the Third, 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits granted 12(b)(6) motions 
(with or without leave to amend) in the Database at about the 
average rate (49%).  Finally, district courts in the First (45%), 
Seventh (33%),268 and Eleventh (31%) Circuits granted 12(b)(6) 
                                                          
 267. See supra Table 2. 
 268. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, was vehement (at least before Twombly) 
about instructing district courts to adhere to “notice pleading.”  See, e.g., Doe v. 
Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Any district judge (for that matter, any 
defendant) tempted to write ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not contain . 
. .’ should stop and think:  What rule of law requires a complaint to contain that 
allegation?”). 













Granted, amend Grant, no amend
Percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted
Reference line at 49% shows overall average.
Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table E. 
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motions (with or without leave to amend) in the Database at a lower-
than-average rate.269 
4. The effect of pro se plaintiffs 
A plaintiff’s pro se status should leap to mind in any theory about 
probable factors that affect a court’s ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.   
It is reasonable to assume that a 12(b)(6) motion has a better chance 
of being granted against a pro se plaintiff’s complaint than a 
complaint filed by a lawyer.270 
Of all cases in the Database, approximately 28% involved pro se 
plaintiffs (281 of 1017 plaintiffs whose status could be determined 
from the opinion).271  Interestingly, the percentage of pro se plaintiffs 
in the Database declined from Conley (30%) to Twombly (27%) to 
Iqbal (24%).272 
“Civil Rights” cases comprised the largest category by nature of suit 
in the Database (about 44%).273  Figure 9 (as detailed in Appendix 
Table F) shows that about 50% of plaintiffs in “Civil Rights” cases in 
the Database were pro se.  Of the Database cases under Conley,  
187 (43%) were “Civil Rights” cases, in which 100 (53%) of plaintiffs 
were pro se.  Under Twombly, 181 (44%) of the Database cases were 
“Civil Rights” cases, in which 91 (50%) of plaintiffs were pro se.  
Under Iqbal, 78 (45%) of the Database cases were “Civil Rights” cases, 
and 30 (38%) of the plaintiffs in those cases were pro se.  Note that 
“Civil Rights” cases are frequently brought by pro se prisoners.274 
Figure 10 shows the difference in rulings on 12(b)(6) motions 
between pro se plaintiffs and plaintiffs represented by counsel under 
all three authorities. 
 
                                                          
 269. It would be interesting to compare the district courts’ rates of granting 
12(b)(6) motions with the caseload per judge in the various districts, but such a 
comparison is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., 2008 REPORT, supra note 265, 
at 409–12 (showing statistic for U.S. District Courts—Weighted and Unweighted 
Filings per Authorized Judgeship During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 
2008).  
 270. See, e.g., BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT 57 (2005) (“Government 
statistics showed that legal representation more than doubled the chances that an 
individual would win asylum.”). 
 271. See infra Appendix Table G.  This is only slightly higher than the percentage 
of all cases filed in federal district courts in fiscal year 2008 by pro se plaintiffs, which 
is 26.5% (70,948 pro se cases of 267,257 total filings).  2008 REPORT, supra note 265, at 
78–80 (Civil Pro Se And Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period 
Ending September 30, 2008). 
 272. See infra Appendix Table G. 
 273. See supra Figure 3; infra Appendix Table A. 
 274. For example, in fiscal year 2008, pro se prisoner petitions made up 71.5% of 
all pro se filings in federal district courts (50,756 pro se prisoner petitions of 70,948 
total pro se cases filed).  2008 REPORT, supra note 265, at 78–80. 
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Figure 9 
Percentage of Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Database 


























































Reference line at 28% shows overall average percentage 
of pro se plaintiffs for all types of cases and authorities. 
























Exact frequencies presented in Appendix Table G.
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The percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in all cases brought 
by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley (67%) to Twombly (69%) to Iqbal 
(85%).  Under any authority, 12(b)(6) motions were granted at a 
much higher rate in cases with a pro se plaintiff than in cases in which 
the plaintiff was represented.  It appears that the boilerplate language 
that pro se plaintiffs’ complaints should be treated with leniency275 is 
not taken very seriously.276 
5.  The effects of other factors 
The two other factors coded in the Database were whether the case 
was brought as a putative class action and whether the ruling on the 
motion was recommended by a magistrate judge rather than ruled on 
or adopted by a district court judge.  The absolute number of cases in 
the Database involving class actions and magistrates is too small to be 
meaningful.  Further, multinomial logistic regressions that included 
these two independent variables indicated that neither variable was 
statistically significant in predicting the ruling on the 12(b)(6) 
motion. 
6. Frequency of cases in the Database that were entirely dismissed upon a 
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend 
Just because a 12(b)(6) motion is granted, even without leave to 
amend, does not mean that the entire case has been dismissed.   
A 12(b)(6) motion will frequently involve less than all counts brought 
or less than all defendants joined in a complaint.  In Iqbal, even if the 
plaintiff is not granted leave to amend on remand,277 he will still have 
a multitude of government-official defendants left in the case.  Thus, 
while the statistics presented above show, for example, that 39% of 
12(b)(6) motions in the Database were granted without leave to 
amend,278 that does not mean that entire cases were dismissed at the 
same rate. 
Only the ruling “grant without leave to amend” could possibly 
result in the case being entirely dismissed at that time.279  Looking 
                                                          
 275. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 276. But see, e.g., Felder v. Del. County Office of Servs. for the Aging, No. 08-4182, 
2009 WL 2278514, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2004) (“It would be unfair to allow a 
Plaintiff to file a pro se Complaint on the standard form, which provides minimal 
room for elaboration on the factual issues [seven lines], and then dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Complaint under Rule 8 for failure to provide more factual allegations.”). 
 277. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to 
district court in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 278. See supra Table 1. 
 279. In some cases, the court warns that if the plaintiff does not amend within a 
certain time period, the complaint will be dismissed, but if judgment was not 
entered, I coded that as a “grant with leave to amend.” 
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only at the 403 cases in the Database in which the court granted the 
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend, the rate of cases entirely 
dismissed upon that ruling actually declined from Conley (66%) to 
Twombly (61%) and Iqbal (62%), but the distribution was not 
statistically significant.  For pro se plaintiffs incurring a ruling of “grant 
without leave to amend,” however, 80% saw their cases entirely 
dismissed, as compared to only 51% for represented plaintiffs.  
Figure 11 presents these results. 
 
Figure 11 
Cases in the Database Entirely Dismissed 




















B. Logistic Regressions  
1. Multinomial logistic regression using the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion as 
the dependent variable 
To better predict the possible effects of Twombly and Iqbal on the 
ruling on 12(b)(6) motions, I performed a multinomial logistic 
regression280 using Stata.281  The multinomial logistic regression model 
                                                          
 280. A multinomial logistic regression tests the strength of a model’s various 
independent variables in predicting the outcome, or dependent variable.   





























Represented Pro se 
By pro se status of plaintiff 
Includes only those 403 cases in the Database in which a 
12(b)(6) motion was granted without leave to amend. 
By authority
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“estimat[es] the probability of different alternatives relative to the 
probability of a baseline.”282  In this regression, the outcome, or 
dependent variable, is the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion.  The 
outcome possibilities are “deny,” “mixed ruling,” “grant with leave to 
amend,” and “grant without leave to amend.”  I set the base outcome 
as “deny,” presumably the best outcome for the plaintiff (non-
movant). 
The independent variables, or possible predictors, used in this 
model included the one in which we are most interested—whether 
the case was decided under Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal—and whether 
plaintiff was represented by counsel or was proceeding pro se, the 
nature of suit, and the circuit within which the district court sits.   
I did not include the indicator variables for judge type and class 
action in the model; earlier models that included these variables 
showed that they had no statistical significance and that their 
presence did not appreciably increase the models’ ability to explain 
the differences in ruling outcomes. 
Dummy (or “binary” or “indicator”) variables were created for the 
six major types of suit and the twelve circuit courts of appeal.283  Based 
on the frequencies in the Database, 12(b)(6) motions are least 
frequently granted in contract cases as compared to the other major 
types of suit, and least frequently granted by district courts in the 
Eleventh Circuit as compared to district courts in the other circuits.  
Accordingly, I omitted the indicator variables for “Contract” and 
“11th Circuit” to use these as baselines.  Note that the regression 
contains only 1017 cases, whereas the Database as a whole contains 
                                                          
except that in multiple regression, the dependent variable is linear (also called 
“continuous” or “quantitative”), while in logistic regression, the dependent variable is 
categorical (also called “qualitative”; two-outcome variables are also called “binary” or 
“dichotomous”).  The major dependent variable in this study—“Ruling”—is 
categorical; the categories are “grant without leave to amend,” “grant with leave to 
amend,” “mixed,” and “deny.”  The other dependent variable in this study—whether 
a case is entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion—is binary (entire 
case dismissed or entire case not dismissed).  The multinomial logistic regression 
model is referred to by different names in various disciplines.  See DAVID W. HOSMER 
& STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 260 (2d ed. 2000) (“[T]he 
model is frequently referred to as the discrete choice model in business and 
econometric literature while it is called the multinomial, polychotomous or polytomous 
logistic regression model in the health and life sciences.”); see also DAMODAR 
GUJARATI, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMETRICS 451–53 (2d ed. 1999) (distinguishing binary 
regression models from multinomial regression models). 
 281. Stata is a commonly used statistical software package available commercially. 
 282. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 608 (2007). 
 283. See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 62 (“[D]iscrete nominal scale 
variables are included properly into the [logistic] analysis only when they have been 
recoded into design variables.”). 
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1039 cases.  Twenty-two cases (2% of the total) were eliminated from 
the regression because each case was missing a value for at least one 
variable.284  Table 4 presents the results of this regression. 
 
Table 4 
Multinomial Logistic Regression on Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions in  
the Database of Cases Between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009  
(four “ruling” outcomes; “deny” is base outcome) 
Number of observations = 1017 log likelihood = -1186.216 
Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000  pseudo R-squared = 0.0954 
Likelihood Ratio chi-squared (57 degrees of freedom) = 250.32 
 
*Probability < 0.1 (considered significant at confidence level of 90%). 






Error z P>|z| 
[90% 
Conf. Interval] 
Twombly 1.342 0.261 1.51 0.131 0.974 1.848 
Iqbal 1.398 0.374 1.25 0.210 0.901 2.170 
Pro se 5.119 1.348 6.20 0.000* 3.320 7.894 
First Cir 3.068 1.795 1.92 0.055* 1.172 8.032 
Second Cir 3.919 1.568 3.42 0.001* 2.030 7.567 
Third Cir 2.062 0.851 1.75 0.080* 1.045 4.067 
Fourth Cir 2.859 1.343 2.24 0.025* 1.320 6.192 
Fifth Cir 1.948 0.828 1.57 0.116 0.969 3.919 
Sixth Cir 3.123 1.315 2.70 0.007* 1.562 6.244 
Seventh Cir 1.334 0.593 0.65 0.517 0.642 2.770 
Eighth Cir 1.695 0.808 1.11 0.268 0.774 3.714 
Ninth Cir 2.500 0.994 2.31 0.021* 1.300 4.808 
Tenth Cir 2.903 1.530 2.02 0.043* 1.220 6.907 
D.C. Cir 8.478 5.418 3.34 0.001* 2.963 24.255 
Tort 1.367 0.461 0.93 0.354 0.785 2.381 
Civ rts 1.828 0.544 2.03 0.043* 1.120 2.983 
Labor 1.023 0.387 0.06 0.951 0.550 1.905 
                                                          
 284. See JOSEPH L. SCHAFER, ANALYSIS OF INCOMPLETE MULTIVARIATE DATA 1 (1997) 
(“Many statistical software packages . . . automatically omit from a linear regression 
analysis any case that has a missing value for any variable. . . . When the incomplete 
cases comprise only a small fraction (say, five percent or less) then case deletion may 
be a perfectly reasonable solution to the missing-data problem.”). 
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IP 0.661 0.329 -0.83 0.405 0.291 1.499 
Other stat 1.875 0.574 2.06 0.040* 1.134 3.102 
 
Odds comparing “grant with leave to amend” to “deny”  
(indicator variables for circuits omitted from Table, although not 
from regression; no variable for circuit was statistically significant at a 







Error z P>|z| 
[90% 
Conf. Interval] 
Twombly 1.806 0.546 1.96 0.050* 1.099 2.969 
Iqbal 4.035 1.398 4.03 0.000* 2.282 7.135 
Pro se 4.352 1.527 4.19 0.000* 2.444 7.750 
Tort 4.318 2.321 2.72 0.007* 1.783 10.454 
Civ rts 2.535 1.222 1.65 0.100* 1.001 5.529 
Labor 1.228 0.874 0.29 0.773 0.381 3.959 
IP 0.748 0.661 -0.33 0.742 0.175 3.198 
Other stat 4.090 2.090 2.76 0.006* 1.764 9.481 
 
Odds comparing “mixed ruling” to “deny”  
(indicator variables for circuits omitted from Table, although not 
from regression; no variable for circuit was statistically significant at a 









Twombly 1.410 0.282 1.72 0.086* 1.015 1.960 
Iqbal 1.255 0.349 0.82 0.414 0.794 1.983 
Pro se 1.462 0.414 1.34 0.179 0.918 2.330 
Tort 1.139 0.364 0.41 0.684 0.673 1.926 
Civ rts 1.715 0.480 1.93 0.054* 1.082 2.718 
Labor 0.224 0.107 -3.12 0.002* 0.101 0.493 
IP 0.191 0.115 -2.75 0.006* 0.071 0.515 
Other stat 0.951 0.288 -0.17 0.868 0.578 1.565 
 
Notes to Table 4:  “Deny” is designated as the base outcome for the 
ruling.  Each other possible outcome (“mixed ruling,” “grant with 
leave to amend,” and “grant without leave to amend”) is compared to 
the base outcome.  I omitted the indicator variables for “Contract” 
and “11th Circuit” to use as baselines. 
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The “pseudo R2” for this model is 0.095.  Loosely, the pseudo R2 is a 
measure of how much of the outcome (here, the ruling) is explained 
by all the various factors used in the model (here, such as the 
authority).285  The model here accounts for only about 9.5% of the 
variance in rulings on the motions.  However, the model is still 
meaningful:  the probability that the model does not explain the 
variance in rulings at all is less than 0.01%.286 
A value greater than 1.0 for the “relative risk ratio” for any variable 
indicates that the presence of that variable (holding all other 
variables constant) increases the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion 
will be granted (with or without leave to amend), or will result in a 
mixed ruling, over the relative risk of the motion being denied.  
However, if the relative risk ratio for the variable is not significant  
(p < 0.10), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variable has 
no impact on the ruling on the motion. 
The relative risk ratio can thus be used to gauge the effect of 
Twombly and Iqbal on rulings as compared to the baseline category, 
which is Conley.287  The effect of either Twombly or Iqbal, in comparison 
to Conley, is at least 1.34 on the relative risk of the motion being 
granted without leave to amend over being denied, meaning that the 
percentage increase of relative risk of the motion being granted 
without leave to amend over being denied is approximately 34%.  
However, this relative risk ratio (for grants without leave to amend as 
compared to denials) is not statistically significant (p = 0.131 under 
Twombly and p = 0.210 under Iqbal). 
Comparing grants with leave to amend to denials under either 
Twombly or Iqbal, the relative risk ratios are statistically significant.  
Under Twombly, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be 
granted with leave to amend, rather than denied, would be expected 
to increase by a factor of 1.81 over Conley, holding all other variables 
constant.  At the 90% confidence level, this relative risk ratio could 
be as low as 1.1 (almost evenly likely) or as high as 2.97 (almost three 
                                                          
 285. See generally, Michael J. Vitacco et al., Predicting Short-Term Institutional 
Aggression in Forensic Patients:  A Multi-Trait Method For Understanding Subtypes of 
Aggression, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 308, 315 (2009) (applying the pseudo R2 to 
determine the impact of different variables on overall variance).  The pseudo R2 is 
one of several measures developed in logistic regression to approximate the R2 in 
linear regression.  Because of mathematical differences between linear regression 
and logistic regression, the pseudo R2 in logistic regression is a less satisfactory 
measure of the “goodness of fit” of the model, and is typically far lower, than the R2 
in a good linear regression model.  HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 166–67. 
 286. This is indicated by the line “Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000.” 
 287. For a detailed explanation of the interpretation of odds ratios, see generally 
HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 280, at 189–92, 286–87. 
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times as likely) as a motion being granted with leave to amend, 
relative to being denied, under Conley. 
Under Iqbal, the relative risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted 
with leave to amend, rather than denied, would be expected to 
increase by a factor of 4.04 over Conley, holding all other variables 
constant.  At the 90% confidence level, this relative risk ratio could 
be as low as 2.28 or as high as 7.14.  Under Iqbal, then, it is more than 
twice as likely, and possibly more than seven times more likely, for a 
12(b)(6) motion to be granted with leave to amend, rather than 
denied, as under Conley, at a 90% confidence level. 
The relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion receiving a “mixed” ruling 
relative to being denied would be expected to increase by a factor of 
1.41 under Twombly than under Conley, holding all other variables 
constant; this is also statistically significant.  At the 90% confidence 
level, this ratio could be as low as 1.02 or as high as 1.96.  The relative 
risk ratio of a 12(b)(6) motion receiving a “mixed” ruling relative to 
being denied under Iqbal as compared to Conley, however, is not 
statistically significant. 
Table 4 also shows that, by far, the variable with the largest 
predicted effect on whether a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted  
(with or without leave to amend), as opposed to the motion being 
denied, is whether the plaintiff is pro se.  The relative risk of a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint being 
granted without leave to amend, rather than denied, is over five times 
greater (5.12 times greater) than for a represented plaintiff.  At a 
90% confidence level, this ratio could be as low as 3.32 times greater 
or as high as 7.89 times greater.  Note that the regression model in 
Table 4 holds constant the “pro se plaintiff” variable when testing for 
the effect of other variables. 
Similarly, the relative risk of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se 
plaintiff’s complaint being granted with leave to amend, rather than 
denied, is over four times greater (4.35 times greater) than for a 
represented plaintiff.  At a 90% confidence level, this ratio could be 
as low as 2.44 times greater or as high as 7.75 times greater. 
As discussed earlier, certain types of suit appear to be associated 
with how the court will rule on a motion.  In the Database, 12(b)(6) 
motions were least frequently granted in “Contract” cases; thus,  
I used “Contract” cases as the baseline.  The relative risk that a 
12(b)(6) motion will be granted without leave to amend, rather than 
denied, in a “Civil Rights” case is 1.83 times greater than in a 
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“Contracts” case, holding all other variables constant.288  The relative 
risk that a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted without leave to amend, 
rather than denied, in a case involving “Other Statutes” is 1.88 times 
greater than in “Contract” cases, holding all other variables 
constant.289  Both of these ratios are statistically significant. 
The circuit within which a district court sits may also have a 
predictive effect on how the court will rule on a 12(b)(6) motion.  
Again using the raw frequencies in the Database as the guide for 
choosing a baseline circuit, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit 
showed the lowest rate of granting 12(b)(6) motions; I therefore 
chose the indicator variable for the Eleventh Circuit as the baseline.  
The relative risk that a district court in the First, Second, Third, 
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits will grant without leave 
to amend, rather than deny, a 12(b)(6) motion are greater than 1.0 
at, at least, a 90% confidence level, than in the apparently most 
lenient Eleventh Circuit. 
2. Logistic regression using the factor of whether the case was entirely 
dismissed as the dependent variable 
I also performed a logistic regression in which “entire case 
dismissed” was the dependent variable (coded “0” if the case was not 
entirely dismissed upon the grant of the 12(b)(6) motion without 
leave to amend, and coded “1” if it was entirely dismissed).  Again, 
only those cases in which the motion was granted without leave to 




Logistic Regression on Cases Entirely Dismissed Upon Grant of 12(b)(6) 
Motion Without Leave to Amend in the Database of Cases  
Between May 22, 2005 and August 31, 2009 
 
Number of observations = 389 log likelihood = -216.751 
Probability > chi-squared = 0.0000  pseudo R-squared = 0.1528 
Likelihood ratio chi-squared (19 degrees of freedom) = 78.17 
 
*Probability < 0.1 (considered significant at confidence level of 90%). 
 
 
                                                          
 288. p = 0.04.  The 90% confidence interval is 1.12 to 2.98. 
 289. p = 0.04.  The 90% confidence interval is 1.13 to 3.10. 
  




Error z P>|z| 
[90% 
Conf. Interval] 
Twombly 0.841 0.220 -0.66 0.509 0.547 1.294 
Iqbal 0.692 0.242 -1.05 0.294 0.389 1.231 
Pro se 3.482 0.951 4.57 0.000* 2.222 5.457 
First Cir 1.326 1.082 0.35 0.729 0.346 5.078 
Second Cir 4.114 2.559 2.27 0.023* 1.479 11.443 
Third Cir 1.847 1.173 0.97 0.334 0.650 5.248 
Fourth Cir 2.052 1.412 1.05 0.296 0.662 6.362 
Fifth Cir 1.439 0.949 0.55 0.581 0.486 4.258 
Sixth Cir 1.756 1.113 0.89 0.374 0.620 4.980 
Seventh Cir 0.629 0.460 -0.63 0.526 0.189 2.093 
Eighth Cir 1.106 0.808 0.14 0.890 0.332 3.681 
Ninth Cir 3.956 2.573 2.11 0.034* 1.357 11.529 
Tenth Cir 0.752 0.538 -0.40 0.690 0.231 2.441 
D.C. Cir 3.113 2.269 1.56 0.119 0.940 10.307 
Tort 0.296 0.158 -2.27 0.023* 0.123 0.714 
Civ rts 1.533 0.670 0.98 0.329 0.747 3.147 
Labor 1.242 0.727 0.37 0.711 0.474 3.253 
IP 0.563 0.464 -0.70 0.486 0.145 2.185 
Other stat 1.265 0.575 0.52 0.605 0.599 2.670 
 
Notes to Table 5:  Only includes 389 cases in the Database in which 
the entire case was dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion 
without leave to amend.  (The total number differs from the total in 
Figure 11 (403 cases) because it was not possible to determine the 
nature of suit in all cases, and any case in which the value for at least 
one variable was missing was eliminated.)  I omitted the indicator 
variables for “Contract” and “11th Circuit” to use as baselines.  I did 
not include the indicator variables for judge type and class action in 
the model. 
 
The results of the logistic regression indicate that the authority 
under which a motion was decided had no statistically significant 
effect on whether a case was entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 
12(b)(6) motion without leave to amend.  The variable with the 
largest predicted effect on whether a case was entirely dismissed was 
whether the plaintiff was pro se.  The odds that a pro se plaintiff’s 
complaint would be entirely dismissed upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) 
motion were 3.48 times greater than the odds that a represented 
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plaintiff’s complaint would be entirely dismissed (at a 90% 
confidence level, the odds could be as low as 2.22  or as high as 5.46).  
In addition, it is significantly more likely that a district court in the 
Second Circuit or the Ninth Circuit would entirely dismiss a case 
upon the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion than a district court in the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, it is significantly 
less likely that a Tort case would be entirely dismissed upon the grant 
of a 12(b)(6) motion than a Contract case.  
CONCLUSION 
Notice pleading may not be “dead”290 in federal court, but the 
prognosis is grave.  Even before Twombly, courts had been straining to 
heighten the pleading standard.  Twombly began the dismantling of 
the well-worn principles federal courts had used for decades to 
decide 12(b)(6) motions by replacing Conley’s “no set of facts” 
standard with the “plausibility” standard and by neglecting to 
mention that all reasonable inferences should be made in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  Even so, the Court in Twombly insisted that it was 
adhering to “notice pleading,” continuing to cite the Conley  
“fair notice” language with approval. 
Several aspects of Iqbal appear designed to hasten the death of 
notice pleading.  First, the Court failed to mention notice pleading at 
all, even as a background reference to the pleadings regime once 
proudly ushered in by the FRCP; and unlike Twombly, Iqbal did not 
expressly reject “heightened” pleading.  Second, Iqbal uncritically 
embraced Twombly’s “plausibility” standard without providing much 
further guidance except for the highly subjective directive to the 
lower courts to use “judicial experience and common sense.”  Third, 
Iqbal reinvigorated the always murky distinction between “facts” and 
“conclusions” in a complaint, inviting judges to somehow identify the 
latter and set them aside. 
This study provides some evidence that district courts are taking 
Twombly and Iqbal to heart.  Especially after Iqbal, they appear to be 
granting 12(b)(6) motions at a significantly higher rate than they did 
under Conley—which was already a sizeable 49% in the Database in 
the two-year period before Twombly.  In addition, Twombly and Iqbal 
are poised to have their greatest impact on civil rights cases, simply 
because those cases are by far the most likely type of case to be 
attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion. 
                                                          
 290. Spencer, supra note 137, at 431. 
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Many may not mourn the passing of notice pleading.  For example, 
a recent report by a blue-ribbon panel suggesting improvements to 
the civil procedure rules recommends the following:  “Notice 
pleading should be replaced by fact-based pleading.  Pleadings 
should set forth with particularity all of the material facts that are 
known to the pleading party to establish the pleading party’s claims 
or affirmative defenses.”291 
But if federal courts are to swing back to a code-pleading-like 
regime, it would best be done by the normal rule amendment 
process.  The “plausibility” standard injects too much subjectivity into 
the ruling, and the very word “plausible” implies a value judgment on 
the merits of the case at the pleadings stage.  This was not the 
original intent of the FRCP, and such a profound shift in philosophy 




                                                          
 291. FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2009), http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.crm? 
Section=Publications (follow “All Publications” hyperlink under the “Publications” 
tab; then follow “Publications of General Interest” hyperlink, follow “2009 ACTL-
IAALS OFFICAL FINAL REPORT” hyperlink). 
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Appendix Table A 
(Backup for Figures 3 and 4) 
Number and Percentage of Cases in the Database by Nature of Suit 
 
Nature of suit Conley Twombly Iqbal Total 






































































































































Total 444 419295 173 1036 
                                                          
 292. Includes two “Real Property” cases. 
 293. Includes four prisoner petitions that are not civil-rights based. 
 294. Includes four “Immigration,” one “Bankruptcy,” and twelve “Federal Tax.” 
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Appendix Table B 
(Backup for Figure 5) 
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for  
Cases in the Database by Nature of Suit and Authority 
 
 Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
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 295. The total here is three less than the total number of cases in the Database 
under Twombly (422) because the “nature of suit” in the three cases could not be 
determined from the opinion. 
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Appendix Table C  
(Backup for Figure 6) 
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for All Cases in the  
Database by Simplified Nature of Suit and Authority 
 
 Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
 Grant (with or 
without leave to 
amend) 















































































































































































Note to Appendix Table C:  Percentages in parentheses represent the 
percentage of rulings in the Database that were decided under the 
particular authority for that particular nature of suit.  For example, in 
“Contract” cases decided under Conley, 32% of all 12(b)(6) motions 
were granted (with or without leave to amend), 38% received a 
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Appendix Table D  
(Backup for Figure 7) 
Number and Percentage of Rulings on 12(b)(6) Motions for All Cases in the 
Database by Detailed Nature of Suit and Authority 
 
 Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
 Grant (with or 
without leave to 
amend)
Mixed ruling Deny 
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Note to Appendix Table D:  Percentages in parentheses represent the 
percentage of rulings in the Database decided under the particular 
authority for that particular nature of suit.  For example, in 
“Contract” cases decided under Conley, 32% of all 12(b)(6) motions 
were granted (with or without leave to amend), 38% received a 
mixed ruling, and 30% were denied. 
 
Appendix Table E 
(Backup for Figure 8)  
Number and Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions  
by District Courts in Circuits 
 
Ruling  












































































































632 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:553 
Appendix Table F 
(Backup for Figure 9) 
Number and Percentage of Represented and Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Database  








































































































































































Notes to Appendix Table F:  The Table does not include cases in 
which the status of the plaintiff or the nature of the suit could not be 
determined from the opinion.  Percentages in parentheses are 
percentages of cases in the Database by nature of suitand by 
authority.  For example, 92% of all plaintiffs in “Contract” cases 
under Conley in the Database were represented by counsel; 8% were 
not. 
  
2010] DO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL MATTER EMPIRICALLY? 633 
Appendix Table G 
(Backup for Figure 10) 
Number and Percentage of Rulings in the Database on 12(b)(6) Motions 
by Status of Plaintiff (Represented or Pro Se) and Authority 
 
Ruling on 12(b)(6) motion
 Grant 
(with or without 
leave to amend) 






































































































Notes to Appendix Table G:  The Table does not include cases in 
which the status of the plaintiff or the nature of suit could not be 
determined from the opinion.  Percentages in parentheses represent 
the percentage of the rulings in the Database that were decided 
under the particular authority for that status of plaintiff.   
For example, in cases decided under Conley, when the plaintiff was 
represented by counsel, 37% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with 
or without leave to amend), 30% received a mixed ruling, and 33% 
were denied; in cases decided under Conley, when the plaintiff was  
pro se, 67% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave 
to amend), 22% received a mixed ruling, and 11% were denied. 
